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PEIRCE 'S  EVOLUTIONARY PRAGMATIC IDEALISM 
This article is dedicated to the memory of Edward 
Carter Moore (1917-1993) - for his many contribu- 
tions to Peirce scholarship. Ed wrote on Peirce, James, 
and Dewey. As Dean of the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts he founded the Transac- 
tions of the Peirce Society. In 1973 he became Dean 
of the Faculties and Professor of Philosophy at Indi- 
ana University/Purdue University at Indianapolis, in 
charge of academic matters of that newly organized 
institution. In that role he founded and directed the 
new chronological edition of Peirce's writings. 
ABSTRACT. In this paper I synthesize a unified system out of Peirce's life work, and name 
it "Peirce's Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism". Peiree developed this philosophy in four 
stages: 
(I) His 1868-69 theory that cognition is a continuous and infinite social semiotic process, 
in which Man is a sign. 
(II) His Popular Science Monthly pragmatism and frequency theory of probabilistic 
induction. 
(III) His 1891-93 cosmic evolutionism of Tychism, Synechism, and Agapism. 
(IV) Pragmaticism: The doctrine of real potentialities ("would-be's'), and Peirce's 
pragmatic program for developing concrete reasonableness. 
Peirce's evolutionary conception of the cosmos is pantheistic, and he constructed it to 
reconcile religion with Darwinian evolution. 
PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEM* 
Peirce said that he never  achieved the system of  phi losophy that he sought, 
but his writings actually do contain (in an evolutionary and spread-out 
manner)  a grand system of  philosophy. This system was a highly original 
form o f  idealism, combining his early semiotic idealism, his pragmatism, 
and his novel  theory o f  cosmic evolution. 
As Peirce recognized,  his pragmatic idealism resembled the absolute 
idealism of  G. W. F. Hegel  (1770-1831).  Both were an outgrowth from 
Immanuel  Kant 's  Critique o f  Pure Reason, Peirce 's  directly and Hegel 's  via 
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Johann Fiehte and F. W. J. Schelling. But hardly any of Peirce's contempo- 
raries recognized that Peirce was developing a form of absolute idealism, 
the absolute idealist Josiah Royce being an exception. 
Peirce was not very influential in his own time. He never found a regular 
academic appointment. Intellectually, his writings were too technical and 
presupposed far too much science and logic for philosophers and others 
who might otherwise have been interested in them. Moreover, Peirce was a 
difficult person. He was often irresponsible; moreover, his life-style clashed 
sharply with the culture and the people in power. As a consequence, he 
never held a philosophical pulpit long enough to spread his message. See 
Joseph Brent's Charles Sanders Peirce-A Life (1993). This is an excellent 
biography, the first presentation actually to explain Peirce's exceptional 
behavior and the failure of his professional and commercial ambitions. 
In this paper I will formulate the philosophy I am calling "Peirce's 
evolutionary pragmatic idealism". As I have edited, studied, and taught 
Peirce over the years I have come to understand his idealistic system 
and to appreciate its originality, depth, and comprehensiveness. Peirce's 
philosophical evolutionism was the first to take account of the sciences 
of  astronomical evolution, physics, chemistry, Darwinian evolution, and 
psychology. It is based on his novel semiotics and on his tripartite logic 
of  discovery, induction, and deduction; and it draws on both the history of 
philosophy and human culture. 
Peirce was one of the creators of the logic of relations, the extension 
of classical logic and Boolean algebra that was needed for a full system 
of symbolic logic. His own writings are relational in having so many 
intercormections, and so the best way to present his philosophy would 
be as a relational structure, or database (Moore and Burks 1992, p. 99). 
And because Peirce's writings are relational we will sometimes repeat a 
quotation when the context is different. 
Peirce's own philosophical evolution began as a reaction to the limits of 
Kant's philosophy of pure and practical reason, and proceeded through 
four main Stages: (I) the logic of relations, semiotics, and the nature of 
inquiry, (II) scientific inquiry and pragmatism, (III) cosmic evolution and 
learning, and (IV) the final formulation of pragmatism (which he called 
pragmaticism). I will list Peirce's most important publications of each stage 
and use their dates to place the stage (Burks 1946b, 1951b, 1964; 1977, 
secs. 4.2 & 8.4; 1990, sec. 4.1). 
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Each stage describes an infinite goal-directed evolutionary process that 
converges on the real, and the four stages together constitute a philosophic 
progression. I also find that the language, concepts, and theses of each 
stage can be reformulated so as to incorporate those of the prior stages. 
(Stage I) From 1867-71 Peirce published a series on logic in the Pro- 
ceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a series on 
intuitive knowledge and semiotics in Volume II of the Journal of Spec- 
ulative Philosophy, and his reviews of the work of Venn and Berkeley. 
Peirce introduced his three categories of Quality-Relation-Representation 
(later to become First-Second-Third) and distinguished the correspond- 
ing kinds of signs (icon-index-symbol) and of arguments (abduction- 
induction-deduction). (Abduction, which Peirce originally called "hypoth- 
esis", is the logic of discovery. Note that the three prefixes to "duction" are 
ab = "away from", in = "inward", and de = "undoing".) 
Peirce also used his understanding of the logic of relations and of 
Darwinian evolution to work his way from Kant's individualistic categories 
to a communal limit theory of communication, inquiry, knowledge, and 
reality. He said that cognition involves a continuous semiotic-inference 
process, and he defined reality in terms of the ultimate result of inquiry: 
And what do we mean by the real? . . .  The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, 
information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of 
the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that 
this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, 
and capable of a definite increase in knowledge. [5.311 ] 
We will discuss this quotation further in the section "Man's Glassy Essence". 
[The reference 5.311 is to paragraph 511 of volume 5 of the Col- 
lected Papers of Charles Sanders Peiree, volumes 1-6 edited by Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, volumes 7-8 by the writer.] 
(Stage II) In 1877-78 Peirce published a series of six papers in the 
Popular Science Monthly under the general title "Illustrations of the Logic 
of Science". The most important was "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", 
the classic statement of pragmatism. In these articles Peirce approached 
learning, knowledge, and reality from the perspective of the community 
of scientific investigators. He transformed his limit theory of inquiry of 
the first stage into pragmatism, giving the first justification of induction in 
terms of frequency probabilities (Burks 1977, see. 3.4.2). 
In 1879 he published a short "Note on the Theory of the Economy of 
Research" [7.139-157; cf. 7.158-161 ]. This was a mathematical treatment 
of the relation of the cost of precise measurement to the resultant reduction 
in the probable error of the results. He used as an example his own mea- 
surements of the force of gravity by swinging a pendulum and measuring 
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its period of oscillation. This was a classic paper on the logical design of 
experiments. 
In these first two stages Peirce treated inference as a human learning 
and evidencing proeess, while in the next two stages he generalized from it 
to a cosmic evolutionary growth process. This big generalization occurred 
at about the same time that Peirce was fired from his professorship at Johns 
Hopkins University and then lost his only regular position, the job at the 
Coast Survey that his father had gotten for him. 
(Stage III) The central publications of this stage were Peirce's 1891-93 
series on metaphysics in The Monist: 
The Architecture of Theories (6.7-34) 
The Doctrine of Necessity Examined (6.35-65) 
The Law of Mind (6.102-165) 
Man's Glassy Essence (6.238-271) 
Evolutionary Love (6.287-317). 
These papers develop Peirce's grand law of  cosmic evolution, the core of 
his evolutionary pragmatic idealism. 
Peirce arrived at his law of cosmic evolution by extending his logical 
categories of First-Second-Third to new realms. In psychology, feelings 
and sense-experiences are Firsts; feelings of resistance and interaction 
and acts of will are Seconds; habits, reasoning, and human intentional 
goal-directedness are Thirds. In metaphysics, monadic properties are First, 
dyadic relations are Seconds, and causal laws are Thirds. 
Now, in cosmology, First, Second, and Third become aspects of the 
evolutionary history of the universe. Tychism, the doctrine that the laws of 
nature and mind are probabilistic, is First, Synechism, the doctrine that the 
evolution of things, laws, systems, and knowledge is strictly continuous, is 
Second. By "continuity" Peirce meant the mathematical sense of that term. 
Agapism, the doctrine that final causes guide evolution toward a supreme 
value goal, is Third. Peirce used these broadened categories as a basis for 
a radically new evolutionary teleological cosmology. Evolution begins as 
an original chaos of bare feelings and gradually evolves the objects and 
laws of astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, humanity, and culture. 
Thus Peirce's grand law of cosmic evolution has three aspects: Tychism 
(chance), Synechism (continuity), and Agapism (love). When we wish to 
emphasize these aspects we will use the name Tyehism-Syneehism-Agapism 
for Peirce's grand law. 
Note that the evolutions depicted in Stages I and II of Peirce's thought 
become the human-history segment of this cosmic telelogical evolutionary 
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process. Peirce recognized the similarity of this segment of  cosmic evo- 
lution to the historical dialectic process described by Hegel, and for this 
reason called his own account of evolution 
objective logic because that conveys the correct idea that it is like Hegel's logic. [1:444] 
In his M o n i s t  series he called his tychism-synechism-agapism theory 
"objective idealism": 
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete 
mind, inveterate habits become physical laws. [6.25; cf. 6.163] 
Thus for Peirce a seemingly universal physical law is the limiting case of  
a statistical law, the case in which the probability of  the effect following 
the cause has evolved to be very close to 1. 
But Peirce also recognized the profound differences between his cosmic 
evolutionism and Hegel's much more limited dialectic evolutionism: 
... my philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume. [1.42, italics added] 
Peirce's evolutionary process from chaos through physics, chemistry, and 
biology to human culture and on to the future is indeed more dynamic and 
certainly much more inclusive than Hegel's dialectical rational evolution 
of  iterated thesis-antithesis-synthesis. 
(Stage IV) In the 1900's Peirce corrected the nominalism of  his pragma- 
tism of  Stage II by his strongly realistic doctrine of "would be 's ' :  Thirds 
are not merely summaries of fact but are real potentialities and final causes. 
He applied this realism to natural classes, causal laws, and dispositional 
probabilities. He then re-formulated his pragmatism of  Stage II as a real- 
istic and cosmically teleological pragmatism, and he planned to develop a 
value foundation for this more general pragmatism. He called this revised 
pragmatism "pragmaticism" to distinguish it from his Stage II pragmatism. 
Traditional logic was normative in the sense that studying it was sup- 
posed to improve one's reasoning skills. Peirce's 1878 statement of  prag- 
matism, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", reflected this goal, and his 1879 
"Note on the Theory of  the Economy of Research" was an early use of  
mathematics to formulate a rational plan for research. In Stage IV Peirce 
argued explicitly that logic was a normative science, and he proposed to 
build a foundation for it of aesthetics and ethics. He also extended his earlier 
theories of  abduction and the economy of  research into a logic of  discov- 
ery (which he called "hypothetic inference"), suggesting applications that 
today would be called "operations research". 
Also in Stage IV Peirce discussed the nature of  God and immortality. He 
stated explicitly that cosmic evolution is semiotic and inferential, i.e., that 
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the p rocesses  o f  Tych ism,  Synech i sm,  and  A g a p i s m  are menta l  p rocesses  
in G o d ' s  mind .  
Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the universe, I 
shall reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, 
working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically 
attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these 
reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe 
- that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out 
this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these per- 
ceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately 
presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature . . . .  
Now as to their function in the economy of the Universe. The Universe as an argument is 
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem - for every fine argument is a poem and a 
symphony - jus t  as every true poem is a sound argument. [5.119, boldface added] 
You would never persuade me that my horse and I do not sympathize, or that the canary 
bird that takes such delight in joking with me does not feel with me and I with him; and 
this instinctive confidence of mine that it is so, is to my mind evidence that it really is so . . . .  
I hear you say: "All that is not fact; it is poetry". Nonsense! Bad poetry is false, I grant; 
but nothing is truer than true poetry. And let me tell the scientific men that the artists are 
much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of the special minutiae that 
the scientific man is looking for. 
I hear you say: "This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception". I reply that 
every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something 
in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes 
&science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. [1.314-316] 
E a c h  o f  the  four  s tages o f  Pe i rce ' s  t hough t  depicts  an  evo lu t ionary  process ,  
each  is ba sed  on  a vers ion  o f  the categor ies  F i r s t -Second-Thi rd ,  and  each  
is b a s e d  on  a vers ion  or  genera l iza t ion  o f  the logics  Abduc t ion - Induc t ion -  
Deduc t ion .  Moreover ,  each  stage can be  adjusted to include the earlier 
s tages b y  appropr ia te  select ions f rom Pe i rce ' s  var ious  formula t ions  and 
te rminologies .  Thus  filtered, modif ied ,  and synthes ized ,  the four  stages 
const i tu te  an  evo lu t ionary  sequence  in w h i c h  each  stage e n c o m p a s s e s  the 
p r eceed ing  stages.  This  cons t ruc t  is the g rand  unif ied ph i losophica l  sys t em 
that  Pei rce  wan ted  to construct ,  though,  as he recognized ,  he was  never  
able to e x p o u n d  it systematical ly .  It is this cons t ruc t  that  I call Peiree's 
evolutionary pragmatie  idealism. 
A l t h o u g h  there are impor tan t  similarit ies be tween  Pe i rce ' s  evo lu t ionary  
p ragmat i c  idea l i sm and  H e g e l ' s  absolute  ideal ism, there are m a n y  respects  
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in which Peirce's philosophy is far superior to Hegel's, and also to the 
absolute idealisms of Hegel's followers. Peirce created a form of cosmic 
and human idealism that takes account of geological and biological evolu- 
tion, and he also used basic concepts from Darwin's theory of evolution, 
a world-shaking theory that had no influence at all on orthodox absolute 
idealisms. Moreover, he suggested the idea of astronomical and physical 
evolution. 
Peirce did not derive his form of idealism from Hegel or his followers, 
but by a quite different route: from Kant (whom he studied intensively with 
his father), medieval and modem logics, philosophic semiotics (which 
he founded), psychology, mathematics and statistics, and the empirical 
sciences, including Darwinian evolution. As a young man Peirce studied 
chemistry and did field work with Louis Agassiz. As a scientist he did 
original work in mathematics, mathematical logic, and computer logic; in 
astronomy, geodetics, and physics; and also in empirical psychology. 
Thus Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism was based on modem 
science, mathematics, and mathematical logic, of which the other absolute 
idealists knew little or nothing. 
As the preceding summary shows, Peirce made repeated use of his three 
categories of First, Second, and Third. Among other applications, he pro- 
duced a classification of 66 different signs (Weiss and Burks 1945). 
Peirce followed Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel in this love for triads. 
Kant used triads to structure his Tables of Judgments and Categories in the 
Critique of PureReason (pp. 1781, 1789). Hegel used his logical dynamic 
of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis iteratively to explain many different aspects 
of reality. All three philosophers found triadic categorial schemes to be 
useful ways of structuring their theories of reality. 
HUMANS HAVE NO FACULTY OF INTUITION 
Peirce's Stage III cosmic evolutionism of Tychism-Synechism-Agapism 
was developed from his earlier Stage I semiotic-inferential evolutionism, 
published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1868~59 [5.213- 
357] under the titles 
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Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man 
Some Consequences of  Four Incapacities 
Grounds of Validity of  the Laws of  Logic: Further Conse- 
quences of  Four Incapacities. 
Peirce begins by asking whether there are any intuitive cognitions, or 
cognitions determined by some thing (some reality) outside of  conscious- 
ness - or whether every cognition is determined by a previous cognition, 
so that cognition takes place entirely in consciousness. 
This question is not easy to understand, because Peirce does not state 
the philosophical position he is criticizing, nor is it easy to recognize the 
position from his criticisms of  it. He is criticizing the epistemology of  
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, so we will say a few words about it. 
Kant held that there is an external world of objects or things-in- 
themselves (ding-an-sich) interacting with the human mind. The human 
mind has two cognitive faculties: sensibility and understanding. Objects 
directly presented to the senses are experienced through sensibility, which 
organizes them by means of its intuitive forms of  space and time. The 
resultant intuitions are then thought in the understanding in accordance 
with the categories, such as the categories of  substance and causality. 
Thus the content of  a sense experience is determined by the thing- 
in-itself, while the spatial, temporal, and categorical organization of  the 
experience is contributed by the mind. Compare, for example, a percept of  
a red table with a percept of  a blue table. The difference in color between 
the two percepts is determined by the things-in-themselves. Likewise, the 
difference between a table percept and a chair percept is due to the thing- 
in-itself. But we can know nothing of the properties of  the thing-in-itself, 
and hence we cannot explain these differences. 
Peirce abhorred such a limitation on human knowledge, and in this 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy series he criticized Kant's epistemology 
and constructed a novel alternative to it. 
Peirce's approach was to argue that humans have no faculty of  intuition, 
and hence that a cognitive-semiotic sequence has no first element. Rather, 
there is only a self-contained sign process: 
All thought, therefore, must necessarily be in signs . . . .  
From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every thought must 
address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a sign. 
... every thought must be interpreted in another . . . .  [5.251-253] 
Peirce then asked "whether there is any cognition not determined by a 
previous cognition", and answered: 
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. . .  to suppose that a cognition is determined solely by something absolutely external, is 
to suppose its determinations incapable of explanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which 
is warranted under no circumstances, inasmuch as the only possible justification for a 
hypothesis is that it explains the facts, and to say that they are explained and at the same 
time to suppose them inexplicable is self-contradictory.... 
No cognition not determined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. [5.260--262] 
Thus Peirce maintained that cognition arises by a continuous process 
without any starting point, rather than from a starting point. To show 
that this is logically possible he constructs a thought experiment o f  an 
inverted triangle which is dipped in water. This conceptual triangle has no 
boundaries, but consists only o f  the points within a hypothetical triangular 
boundary. Topologically, the triangle is an "open area", in contrast to a 
triangle with boundaries, which is a closed area. 
Now let any horizontal line represent a cognition, and let the length of the line serve to 
measure (so to speak) the liveliness of consciousness in that cognition. A point, having 
no length, will, on this principle, represent an object quite out of consciousness. Let 
one horizontal line below another represent a cognition which determines the cognition 
represented by the other and which has the same object as the latter. Let the finite distance 
between two such lines represent that they are two different cognitions. [5.263] 
It is clear that in this model o f  the cognitive process there is no first 
horizontal line, and hence no first cognition. 
The corresponding Kantian model o f  the cognitive process would be 
represented by a closed triangle, with a point at its lower apex that would 
touch the water first, and thus represent the first cognition of  a cognitive 
process. This point would gradually grow from a point into a longer and 
longer horizontal line. 
(Peirce was enamored of  the interesting properties o f  mathematical 
continua. These play a large role in his evolutionism, for his doctrine o f  
Synechism is based on continua.) 
Thus for Peirce, knowledge is the limit point of  an infinite semiotic 
process that has no intuitive starting point. 
MAN'S GLASSY ESSENCE 
Through all o f  the first paper o f  the Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
series and almost all o f  the second paper, Peirce develops his theory o f  
cognition entirely in terms of  an individual knower and his logic, though in 
passing he does introduce the idea o f  an unlimited or infinite community 
of  philosophers: 
We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; 
we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. [5.265] 
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In focussing so long on the individual knower  Peirce is following in the 
tradition that led to Kant. 
But  then, near  the end o f  the second paper, Peirce abruptly shifts his 
perspective,  and begins philosophizing about the infinite human cognitive 
community,  that is, the presumed infinite history o f  organized human civ- 
ilization. He  states the essence o f  his position so well that I quote him at 
length. 
. . .  there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though 
things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that relation. The cognitions 
which thus reach us by this infinite series of inductions and hypotheses (which though 
infinite a parte ante logiee, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in 
time) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and 
those whose objects are unreal. And what do we mean by the real? . . .  The real, then, is 
that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is 
therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception 
of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, 
without definite limits, and [always] capable of a definite increase in knowledge. [5.311] 
Hence  for Peirce, knowledge in the strict sense cannot be achieved by  
an individual inquirer, but only by  an infinite communi ty  o f  inquirers, and 
Peirce defines both reality and truth in terms o f  this infinite community.  
This is a strong form o f  the realistic doctrine that the laws o f  nature and 
the properties they interconnect  are real, for Peirce defines the concept  
o f  reali ty here in terms o f  infinite history. In the next  paragraph [5.312], 
Peirce argues for the existence o f  real classes o f  events and real regularities 
or limiting points o f  inquiry that go beyond finite summaries o f  what has 
happened.  
Now inquiry is a form of  semiosis, and a single individual contributes 
to this infinite process as a member  o f  an ongoing community.  Peirce 
transforms this point into the thesis that the mind is a sign. His statement 
is long and involved, but it is typical Peirce and foreshadows much o f  his 
later thought. 
Such being the nature of reality in general, in what does the reality of the mind consist? 
We have seen that the content of consciousness, the entire phenomenal manifestation of 
mind, is a sign resulting from inference. Upon our principle, therefore, that the absolutely 
ineognizable does not exist, so that the phenomenal manifestation of a substance is the 
substance, we must conclude that the mind is a sign developing according to the laws of 
inference. What distinguishes a man from a word? There is a distinction doubtless. 
[But] there is no element whatever of man's consciousness which has not something 
corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign which 
man uses is the man himself . . . .  the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction 
with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that MAN IS A SIGN; [and since signs 
refer to things external to themselves] man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and 
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the external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words homo and man are 
identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought. 
It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his 
will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an 
instrument 0f thought. But the identity of a man consists in the consistency of what he does 
and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing 
something. 
Finally, [just] as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to 
be in the ideal state of complete information, so that REALITY DEPENDS ON THE 
ULTIMATE DECISION OF THE COMMUNITY; so thought is what it is, only by virtue 
of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though 
more developed. In this way the existence of thought now depends on what is to be 
hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the 
community. 
The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and 
error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, 
is only a negation. This is man, 
" . . .  proud man, 
Most ignorant of what he's most assured, 
His glassy essence". 
[5.313-317, boldface and capitalization added] 
Thus ends the paper! 
Peirce is quoting from Shakespeare: 
Could great men thunder 
As jove himself does, Jove would nere be quiet, 
For every pelting, petty officer 
Would use his heaven for thunder, 
Nothing but thunder! Merciful heaven! 
Thou rather with thy sharp and sulfurous bolt 
Splits the unwedgeable and gnarled oak 
Than the soft myrtle; but man, proud man, 
Dress'd in a little brief authority, 
Most ignorant o f  what he's most a s s u r ' d -  
His glassy essence -- like an angry ape, 
Plans such fantastic tricks before high heaven 
As make the angels weap; who, with our spleens, 
Would all themselves laugh mortal. 
[Measure for  Measure, act 2, scene 2, lines 111-123; bold italics added] 
What, then, is man's essence, and why is it glassy? His essence is to be a 
reasoning sign-user in an indefinite community, and he is glassy. "Glassy" 
suggests a mirror: 
. . .  thought is the mirror of being, the law that the end of being and highest reality is the 
living impersonation of the idea that evolution generates. Whatever is real is the law of 
something less real. [ 1.487] 
334 ARTHUR W. BURKS 
"Glassy"  also suggests "brittle" or "frail". A human is a fragile being, for 
each person is a transient sign in an infinite sign process. Finally, "glassy" 
suggests a crystal ball. Earlier in the scene Angelo says: 
The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept. 
Those many had not dar'e to do that evil, 
If the first that did th' edict infringe 
Had answer'd for his deed. Now 'tis awake, 
Takes note of what is done, and like a prophet 
Looks in a glass that shows what future evils, 
Either new, or be remissness new-conceiv'd, 
And so in progress to be hatch'd and born, 
Are now to have no successive degrees, 
But, ere they live, to end. 
[Measure for Measure, act 2, scene 2, lines 90-99] 
Thus in the first stage o f  his intellectual development  Peirce rejected Kant 's  
view that some reality external to the human mind is the causal basis 
o f  human experience,  and replaced it with his own theory o f  an infinite 
semiotic process. He  then defined truth and reality as follows: 
And what do we mean by the real? The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information 
and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of 
me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception 
essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of 
a definite increase in knowledge. [5.311] 
• .. reality consists in the agreement that the whole community would eventually come 
to..., this theory of reality.., makes all reality something which is constituted by an event 
indefinitely future. [5.331] 
Thus there is an opinion that the presumed infinite history o f  human inquiry 
approaches as a limit, and this is defined to be the truth. 
Now human life is finite so no human or organization o f  humans attains 
truth in this limiting sense, and Peiree has not given practical definitions 
o f  truth and reality. We will return to this issue in the sections "Tychism" 
and "Pragmatism".  
M A N  IS A SIGN IN AN INFINITE SEMIOTIC AND INFERENTIAL 
P R O C E S S ' t h i s  is Peirce 's  lifelong idealistic thesis. He stated it as a young 
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man, and developed it in three successive stages throughout the remainder 
of  his life. In all four stages he makes the destiny of the evolutionary 
process the highest reality. 
His Stage I formulation was in terms of the infinite community of  human 
sign users. In Stage II Peirce focussed on the infinite community of  sci- 
entific inquirers, of  which he was a self-conscious member throughout his 
life. The result was his famous pragmatic theory of  meaning of  the Popular 
Science Monthly series of  1877-78. "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" gives 
the analysis for categorical statements: the meaning of  a statement consists 
of  its practical consequences. Later papers in the series extend pragmatism 
to probabilistic statements. A group of inquirers gathers a finite amount 
of  information about the relative frequency of  a phenomenon and takes 
this observed frequency as a sign of the limiting relative frequency or 
probability. 
In Stage III of  his philosophizing, Peirce analogized from the infinite 
semiotic inferential evolutionism of the human community to an infinite 
cosmic evolutionism (Tychism-Synechism-Agapism). Although this was 
a very big analogical jump, Peirce made only two brief references to the 
fact that he was making it! In neither case did he tell the reader that he was 
extrapolating from human evolution to cosmic evolution! The first of  the 
two references was in "The Law of  Mind" [6.102-163]: 
The tendency to regard continuity, in the sense in which I shall define it, as an idea of 
prime importance in philosophy may conveniently be termed synechism. The present paper 
is intended chiefly to show what synechism is, and what it leads to. I a t tempted,  a good 
many years ago, to develop this doctrine in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (Vol. 
II); but I am able now to improve upon that exposition . . . .  
Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, 
namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand 
to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and 
especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other 
ideas. [6.103-104; boldface added] 
Peirce's second reference to the derivation of  his Stage 1II cosmic 
evolutionism from his Stage I human evolutionism occurs late in "Man's 
Glassy Essence" [6.238-271]. This paper is Peirce at his frustrating best: 
nowhere is the phrase "man's glassy essence" explained or even used in 
the paper! Moreover, most of  the paper is about highly technical physics 
and physiology, including a pioneering attempt at a molecular explanation 
of  habit. Finally, near the end of  the paper Peirce suddenly starts talking 
philosophy, and he ends with an intriguing theory of  consciousness: 
The consciousness of a general idea has a certain "unity of the ego," in it, which is identical 
when it passes from one mind to another. It is, therefore, quite analogous to a person; 
and, indeed, a person is only a particular kind of general idea. Long ago, in the Journal of 
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Speculative Philosophy (Vol. II, p. 156), I pointed out that a person is nothing but a symbol 
involving a general idea; but my views Were, then, too nominalistic to enable me to see that 
every general idea has the unified living feeling of a person. 
All that is necessary, upon this theory, to the existence of a person is that the feelings out 
of which he is constructed should be in close enough connection to influence one another. 
Here we can draw a consequence which it may be possible to submit to experimental 
test. Namely, if this be the case, there should be something like personal consciousness 
in bodies of men who are in intimate and intensely sympathetic communion. It is true 
that when the generalization of feeling has been carried so far as to include all within a 
person, a stopping-place, in a certain sense, has been attained; and further generalization 
will have a less lively character. But we must not think it will cease. Esprit de corps, national 
sentiment, sym-pathy, are no mere metaphors. None of us can fully realize what the minds 
of corporations are, any more than one of my brain cells can know what the whole brain 
is thinking. But the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities . . . .  
[6.270-271] 
We will re tum to this quotation at the end o f  the paper. 
TYCHISM 
Peirce, like most  idealists, took the human mind as a model  o f  the universe 
- t h e  knower  as the model  o f  the known. He was also an empirical scientist, 
and in that role he took the human mind to be a representative sample o f  the 
history o f  the universe. He emphasized the logical and semiotic activities 
o f  humans,  and generalized from them to the infinite past and to the infinite 
future. The theme "the human sign user is a symbol o f  the universe" runs 
through all four stages o f  Peirce 's  philosophy. 
At the time, physicists generally held that the basic laws o f  nature are 
all categorical ly universal; that is, they are all o f  the form 
For  any situation s: i f  condition C obtains at s, then result R 
will obtain at s. 
The  contrast is with statistical or probabilistic laws. The equations gov- 
erning the movements  o f  the planets around the sun are a good example 
o f  categorical universality, for the present state o f  the solar system math- 
ematically entails any future state. Peirce was exceptional in rejecting the 
categorical universality o f  the basic laws o f  physics,  and in holding that 
all laws o f  nature are statistical or probabilistic. According to modern 
quantum mechanics  they are. 
Peirce gave two arguments for his thesis that all laws o f  nature are 
probabilistic or statistical. 
The  first argument arose from his research at the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey. He made  precise measurements  o f  the strength o f  gravity at various 
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places in the United States and Europe. Scientific measurements always 
involve experimental error or uncertainty, which is usually attributed to 
the experimenter and the equipment. But Peirce argued that not all of  the 
uncertainty is measurement error, that some of  it is intrinsic to nature. He 
concluded that every physical law is intrinsically imprecise, involving at 
least a small amount of  statistical variation. In other words, every physical 
law is at least slightly statistical. 
It should be noticed that this is a novel argument against determinism. 
The usual indeterminist accepts that there are logically universal scientific 
laws, and then argues that this body of laws does not completely rule 
nature. 
Peirce's second argument against the doctrine that all laws are categor- 
ically universal is also novel, but more complicated. It derives from his 
rejection of  the claim that some statements can be known with certainty. 
Consider the view that each of us can know some aspect of  our experiences 
directly but other agents can know these aspects only indirectly. Examples 
are: "it appears to me that there is a round table over there" and "I feel 
a pain in my side". Some philosophers hold that with sufficient care such 
appearance statements can be known with certainty, and that this certainty 
is a starting point for empirical knowledge of  the things outside of  us (the 
external world). 
Such appearance statements are said to be known directly, by the fac- 
ulty of  intuition. But Peirce's goal in his 1868-69 Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy series was to show that humans have no faculty of intuition. 
He then developed the alternative view that all empirical knowledge is 
gained by a semiotic process of inference and hence by the use of signs 
and symbols. 
Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ulti- 
mate . . . .  Now that anything is thus inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from 
signs. But the only justification of an inference from signs is that the conclusion explains 
the fact. To suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain it, and hence this 
supposition is never allowable. [5.265] 
Finally, no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intel- 
lectual value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be 
connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought 
is altogether something virtual. [5.289] 
Peirce believed that evolution proceeds forever and approaches a limit, and 
hence that truths exist. 
[In my opinion there is a fundamental weakness in Peirce's way of  
defining empirical truth. His definition covers universal statements but not 
particular statements, since the latter do not refer to infinite sequences. 
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But universal truths are derived from singular truths by induction. Hence 
Peirce's doctrine that no present thought has meaning has a fatal conse- 
quence: for all practical purposes, meanings are lost in an infinite regress. 
(See Burks 1977, secs. 3.4.2 & 5.6; 1981, p. 291).] 
Now if  no empirical statement can be known with certainty, there are 
no basic facts on which explanations can be grounded. From this Peirce 
concludes that everything needs to be explained: one o f  his mottos was 
"Do not block the road o f  inquiry" 
Do not block the way of inquiry. 
. . .  to set up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is 
the one unpardonable offence in reasoning . . . .  (I. 135-6, c. 1899) 
But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids 
us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely 
inexplicable. This is what Kant (after the Scholastics) calls a regulative principle, that is to 
say, an intellectual hope. 
Among other regular facts that have to be explained is law or regularity itself. 
Moreover, conformity with law is a fact requiring to be explained; and since law in general 
cannot be explained by any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing how 
law is developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. (1.405-7, c. 1890) 
Thus Peirce's explanation of  the existence o f  regularities and laws is that 
these have been created ex nihilo (from the primitive chaos o f  feelings) 
by  the very gradual operation of  the cosmic law o f  evolution (Tychism- 
Synechism-Agapism).  
Lamarck 's  theory that small living things arose spontaneously from non- 
living things blocked the road to inquiry, for it gave a one-shot explanation 
of  the origin o f  life rather than a gradual explanation. Since then a gradual 
explanation o f  the origin o f  life from chemicals has been developed. 
Peirce introduces his doctrine that all laws are probabilistic at 6.33 of  the 
first essay of  the 1891-93 Monist series, "The Architecture o f  Theories". 
He defends the doctrine at length in the second essay ("The Doctrine o f  
Necessi ty Examined"),  but does not name it until the beginning of  the third 
essay (at 6.102 of  "The Law of  Mind"). He calls the doctrine "tychism",  
from a Greek word meaning chance. 
Peirce's doctrine o f  Tychism leads naturally to Synechism, his doctrine 
that laws evolve continuously from randomness to regularity. 
The infallibilist naturally thinks that everything always was substantially as it is now. Laws 
at any rate being absolute could not grow. They either always were, or they sprang instan- 
taneously into being by a sudden fiat like the drill of a company of soldiers. This makes the 
laws of nature absolutely blind and inexplicable. Their why and wherefore can't be asked. 
This absolutely blocks the road of inquiry.... If all things are continuous, the universe 
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must be existence. There is no difficulty in conceiving existence as a matter of degree. The 
reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition. If a 
thing has no such persistence, it is a mere dream. Reality, then, is persistence, is regularity. 
In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no existence. It was all a 
confused dream. This we may suppose was in the infinitely distant past. But as things are 
getting more regular, more persistent, they are getting less dreamy and more real. [1.175] 
THE COSMIC LAW OF MIND 
T h u s  for  Pe i rce ,  b o t h  the  ex i s t ence  o f  l aws  o f  na tu re  and  the i r  s ta t i s t ica l  
c h a r a c t e r  n e e d  to b e  exp la ined .  
. . .  a uniformity, or law, ispar excellence, the thing that requires an explanation. (6.612) 
Now to suppose a thing inexplicable is not only to fail to explain it, and so to make 
an unjustifiable hypothesis, but much worse, it is to set up a barrier across the road of 
science, and to forbid any attempt to understand the phenomenon. (6.171) 
In  the  f irst  a r t i c le  ( "The  A r c h i t e c t u r e  o f  T h e o r i e s " )  o f  his  1 8 9 1 - 9 3  se r ies  
in  The Monist P e i r c e  g ives  his  answer :  
Now the only possible way o f  accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity in 
general is to suppose them results of evolution. This supposes them not to be absolute, 
not to be obeyed precisely. It makes an element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute 
chance in nature. (6.13) 
A n d  s ince  he  t o o k  the h u m a n  m i n d  to be  a m o d e l  o f  the  un ive rse ,  he  l o o k e d  
to his  th ree  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c a t ego r i e s  to see  h o w  this  p r o c e s s  o f  evo lu t ion  
w o r k s :  
Passing to psychology, we find [that] the elementary phenomena of mind fall into three 
categories. First, we have Feelings, comprising all that is immediately present, such as pain, 
blue, cheerfulness, the feeling that arises when we contemplate a consistent theory, etc. A 
feeling is a state of mind having its own living quality, independent of any other state of 
mind. 
Besides Feelings, we have Sensations of reaction; as when a person blindfold suddenly 
runs against a post, when we make a muscular effort, or when any feeling gives way to a 
new feeling . . . .  The sense of reaction is thus a sense of connection or comparison between 
feelings . . . .  
Very different both from feelings and from reaction-sensations or disturbances of feeling 
are general conceptions. When we think, we are conscious that a connection between 
feelings is determined by a general rule, we are aware of being governed by a habit . . . .  
The one primary and fimdamental law of mental action consists in a tendency to general- 
ization. Feeling tends to spread; connections between feelings awaken feelings; neighboring 
feelings become assimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves. These are so many for- 
mulations of the one law of the growth of mind. [6.18--21 ] 
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Peirce then contrasts mental with physical laws. 
The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws in the character of its 
commands. A physical law is absolute. What it requires is an exact relation . . . .  On the 
other hand, no exact conformity is required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity 
would be in downright conflict with the law; since it would instantly crystallize thought and 
prevent all further formation of habit. The law of mind only makes a given feeling more 
likely to arise. [6.23] 
(This quotation illustrates Peirce's preference for making striking state- 
ments without adding needed qualifications. As we saw in the last section, 
he held that every physical law is at least slightly statistical, which contra- 
dicts the physicist 's bel ief  that a law specifies "an exact relation". Hence 
he should have said that physicists formulate  physical laws as absolute, 
though these laws are in fact only almost  absolute.) 
Peirce calls his cosmic law of  mind b y  various names: "synechism",  
"the law of  habit", "the mental law", "the general law o f  mental action", 
and "the law of  mind". He introduces the law as follows: 
The next step in the study of cosmology [after tychism] must be to examine the general law 
of mental action . . . .  The tendency to regard continuity, in the sense in which I shall define 
it, as an idea of prime importance in philosophy may conveniently be termed synechism. 
The present paper is intended chiefly to show what synechism is, and what it leads to. I 
attempted, a good many years ago, to develop this doctrine in the Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy (Vol. II) [5.213-357]; but I am able now to improve upon that exposition, in 
which I was a little blinded by nominalistic prepossessions. I refer to it, because students 
may possibly find that some points not sufficiently explained in the present paper are cleared 
up in those earlier ones. 
Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, 
namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand 
to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and 
especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other 
ideas. [6.103-104] 
Peirce also spoke o f " the  tendency to generalize", "the spreading of  ideas", 
and "habit  taking". 
[The reader may  notice that parts o f  the preceding quotation were quoted 
already, near the end o f  the section "Man's  Glassy Essence". But they play 
a different role here than in the earlier context.] 
Peirce's law of  mind is clearly a generalization from the psychologist 's  
law o f  association by similarity and contiguity, and thus a generalization 
from a law governing the human mind to the basic law governing the 
cosmos, or absolute mind. In other words, Peirce took human learning as 
a model  for cosmic learning. The last paragraph o f " T h e  Law of  Mind"  is: 
I have thus developed as well as I could in a little space the synechistic philosophy, as applied 
to mind. I think that I have succeeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room for 
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explanations of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly inexplicable; 
and further that it carries along with it the following doctrines: first, a logical realism of 
the most pronounced type; second, objective idealism; third, tychism, with its consequent 
thorough-going evolutionism. We also notice that the doctrine presents no hindrances to 
spiritual influences, such as some philosophies are felt to do. (6.163; el. 6.271) 
I will make two comments  on this quotation. 
(First comment)  William James also thought that spiritual phenomena 
might give empirical evidence for some form of  Diety. James was Peirce 's  
most  loyal friend, helping Peirce when he was in need more than anyone 
else. Soon after James died, in 1910, Peirce wrote perceptively about James 
and Peirce 's  own relation to him. 
His comprehension of men to the very core was most wonderful. Who, for example, could 
be of a nature so different from his as I? He so concrete, so living; I a mere table of contents, 
so abstract, a very snarl of twine. Yet in all my life I found scarce any soul that seemed to 
comprehend, naturally, [not] my concepts, but the mainspring of my life better than he did. 
He was even greater [in the] practice than in the theory of psychology. [6.184] 
(Second comment)  In the quotation 6.163 (1892) Peirce defined syne- 
chism to be a cosmological  law. But in 1902 Peirce defined synechism 
differently, as a regulative principle o f  logic: 
[Synechism is] that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of 
continuity as of prime importance in philosophy and, in particular, upon the necessity of 
hypotheses involving true continuity. 
Now, to suppose a thing inexplicable is not only to fail to explain it, and so to make an 
unjustifiable hypothesis, but, much worse, it is to set up a barrier across the road of science, 
and to forbid all attempt to understand the phenomenon. 
Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle 
of logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined. [6.169- 
173] 
We saw in the section on Tychism how Peirce used this regulative principle 
o f  synechism to argue for the thesis tha t  all laws o f  nature are statistical: 
to assume unchanging deterministic laws is "to block the road o f  scientific 
inquiry". Instead, Peirce explained the existence o f  laws in terms o f  their 
very  gradual or synechistic evolution from chaos. 
Peirce thought logic should be treated as a normative science o f  reasoning, 
and so for him the three logical modes o f  abduction (First), induction 
(Second),  and deduction (Third) constitute the deliberate and controlled 
operations o f  the human mind. 
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By hypothetic inference [abduction] a number of reactions called for by one occasion get 
united in a general idea which is called out by the same occasion. [6.146] 
By induction, a habit becomes established. [6.145] 
In deduction the mind is under the dominion of a habit or association . . . .  That is the 
way the hind legs of a frog, separated from the rest of the body, reason, when you pinch 
them. (6.144, 1892, with italics added) 
This last comment  illustrates the depth of  Peirce's understanding of  the 
role o f  logic in nature. He elucidates his meaning in his 1883 Studies in 
Logic volume: 
•.. a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated 
frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve ... constitutes a nervous 
habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological analogue of the major premiss• The 
disturbance of the ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form 
of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically considered, is the 
occurrence of a case. The explosion through the efferent nerve is the physiological form 
of that which psychologically is a volition, and logically the inference of a result. [2.711, 
1883; el. 3.154-161, 1880] 
It is well known today that a neuron is a mixed analog-digital logical switch 
and computing device. 
Thus Peirce recognized that neurons are logical elements, and he was 
the first to do so. At about the same time he recognized that electromagnetic 
relays could be used to do logic. Furthermore, he saw that relays could be 
used to build an electrical version of  Charles Babbage's analytical engine. 
In both cases, he was more than 50 years ahead of  his time. (See Burks 
and Burks 1988a and 1988b.) 
Peirce believed that a machine could not discover interesting theorems 
or do original work (Peirce 1887). In contrast, I have argued that a finite 
automaton can perform all human functions (Burks 1972-73, t986, 1990). 
TYCHISM--SYNECHISM---AGAPISM 
Although Peirce was a founder o f  semiotics and understood in principle 
the value o f  well-defined terms in technical writing, he was too rhetorical 
and impractical to follow that principle in his own philosophical writing. 
For example, in "The Law of  Mind"  he uses four different names for the 
subject o f  the paper: "the law of  mind" [6.104, 6.127, 6.150], "the general 
law o f  mental actions" [6.103], "the law of  continuous spreading", and 
"synechism" [6.103, 6.163]. More important, he seems to leave the reader 
without any name for his grand law of  cosmic evolution. That is why  
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I introduced the technical term "Tychism-Synechism-Agapism" for this 
law (in the first section of  this paper). 
The doctrines of  Tychism, Synechism, and Agapism constitute the core 
of  Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism. That philosophy also includes 
Peirce's concept of  God, his teleological pragmaticism with its associated 
doctrines of  final causality and concrete reasonableness, his modal realism 
of  "would-be's" or real potentialities, and his conception of  logic as a 
normative science. 
Tychism-Synechism-Agapism is the basic principle governing the cre- 
ation, evolution, and destiny of  the cosmos. Peirce is a panpsychist, making 
feelings (psychological firsts) the elementary building blocks of  the uni- 
verse. The universe starts as a chaos of  these feelings, not even organized 
in space and time. In our time the evolutionary process has reached the 
mixed ordered and chaotic state we know. In the future the cosmos will 
move on indefinitely toward a perfectly ordered and rational system. 
... in the beginning - infinitely remote - there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, 
which being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence. This 
feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a 
generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but this would have a 
growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and from this, with the other 
principles of evolution, all the regularities of the universe would be evolved. At any time, 
however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an 
absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallized 
in the infinitely distant future. [6.33--1891] 
This passage gives Peirce's metaphysical extrapolation, both backward 
and forward, of  the 19th century doctrine of  progress. Cosmic evolution 
began as an unorganized set of  feelings, gradually evolved things and laws 
organized in space and time, then living things, and finally we humans 
and our social organizations. This evolutionary process will continue on, 
moving towards cosmic goals. By the very nature of  a limit, the goals of  the 
process will never be reached, so that at any particular moment there will be 
some randomness, some imperfection, and some room for improvement. 
In characterizing the destiny of  the universe in this way, Peirce had in 
mind the Hindu and Buddhist ideas of  Nirvana. At the beginning of  "The 
Law of  Mind" he summarizes what he has shown in the two preceeding 
papers of  The Monist series: 
. . .  t y c h i s m  must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology in which all the regularities 
of  nature and of  mind are regarded as products of  growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned 
idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. I may 
mention, for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental biographies, that I 
was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord - I mean in Cambridge - at the time 
when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught 
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from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds 
stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East. [6.102] 
Christine Ladd-Frankl in  was a noted psychologis t  and logician who 
had studied with Peirce at Johns Hopkins  University. In an 1891 letter to 
her  Peirce said: 
. . .  my cosmology.., is that the evolution of the world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds 
from one state of things in the infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite 
future. The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, toho bohu, the nothingness of which 
consists in the total absence ofregnlarity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, 
the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and the absence of all 
spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some 
absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity of law, which is 
constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. The tendency to form habits or 
tendency to generalize, is something which grows by its own action, by the habit of taking 
habits itself growing. Its first germs arose from pure chance. There were slight tendencies 
to obey rules that had been followed, and these tendencies were rules which were more 
and more obeyed by their own action. There were also slight tendencies to do otherwise 
than previously, and these destroyed themselves. To be sure, they would sometimes be 
strengthened by the opposite tendency, but the stronger they became the more they would 
tend to destroy themselves. As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads 
back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. 
I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose matter is merely mind 
deadened by the development of habit. While every physical process can be reversed without 
violation of the law of mechanics, the law of habit forbids such reversal. Accordingly, time 
may have been evolved by the action of habit. At first sight, it seems absurd or mysterious 
to speak of time being evolved, for evolution presupposes time. But after all, this is no 
serious objection, and nothing can be simpler. Time consists in a regularity in the relations 
of interacting feelings. The first chaos consisted of an infinite multitude of feelings. As 
there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a powder of feelings. It was worse 
than that, for of particles of powder some are nearer together, others farther apart, while 
these feelings had no relations, for relations are general. [8.317-318] 
As Peirce recognizes,  the idea that t ime i tself  evolved seems absurd. It 
certainly violates c o m m o n  sense, but so does the current b ig-bang theory 
o f  the origin o f  the universe. This theory states that the universe started as 
a point  a tom ("cosmic  egg")  which exploded at the beginning o f  time, and 
since then space has constant ly expanded,  like the surface o f  an expanding 
3-dimensional  sphere. When  I was a graduate student m a n y  phi losophers  
rejected Albert  Einstein 's  special theory o f  relatively because  o f  the rel- 
at ively o f  simultaneity: it seemed obvious  to them that there is only  one 
t ime-frame.  And  yet  the special theory o f  relatively implies the intercon- 
vertibil i ty o f  matter  and energy, o f  which the a tom b o m b  was a practical  
consequence!  
Peirce had a relational theory o f  the nature o f  space and time. According 
to this theory, space and t ime are relations connect ing objects and events, 
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and so space and time cannot exist until objects and events exist. As the 
ultimate atoms of  the universe, panpsychic feelings (Firsts) are too simple 
to be related by space and time. Objects and events are relational complexes 
of  Firsts, and are organized by the relations of  space and time. This is 
the sense in which space and time have evolved under the cosmological 
principle of  Tychism-Synechism-Agapism. 
Thus for Peirce evolution is a hierarchical process with three aspects: 
First: TYCHISM (from the Greek word meaning chance), the doctrine 
that probabilistic laws are basic, and deterministic laws are limiting cases 
of  them 
Second: SYNECHISM (from the Greek word meaning continuity), the 
doctrine that reality is in a strictly continuous process of  evolutionary 
development, moving from a state of complete randomness toward perfect 
regularity 
Third: AGAPISM (from the Greek word meaning love), the doctrine that 
cosmic evolution is goal-directed, governed by final causes. For "agapism" 
Peirce also used "evolutionary love" and "final cause". 
According to Tychism the primitive chaos consisted of elementary feel- 
ings (psychological Firsts). Slight tendencies to obey rules developed by 
chance, and some of  these probabilistic connections developed into habits 
and laws of  nature. The most primitive atoms of  the universe are feelings 
(psychological Firsts), and the universe began as a chaos of feelings. 
Synechism is the doctrine that natural classes, laws, and systems of  
the universe evolve continuously in the strict mathematical sense. The 
spreading of feelings and the growth of  generalizations are continuous. 
Modern genetics tells us that this is not so, that evolution actually proceeds 
in very small discrete steps. But with this mathematical adjustment, Peirce's 
characterization of  evolution as a growing, developmental, learning process 
is essentially correct (Burks 1991). 
Agapism is the doctrine that the synechistic evolution oftychistic laws 
is guided by Aristotelian final causes. We give several quotes from Peirce 
on this point. 
To say that the future does not influence the present is untenable doctrine. It is as much to 
say that there are no final causes, or ends. The organic world is full of refutations of that 
position. Such action constitutes evolution... [2.86] 
... physical evolution works toward ends in the same way that mental action works 
toward ends, and thus ... final causation is alone primary. [6.101] 
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. . .  ideas are not all mere creations of this or that mind, but on the contrary have the 
power of finding or creating their vehicles, and having found them, of conferring on them 
the ability to transform the face of the earth. [ 1.217] 
[In a letter to William James Peirce said:] 
I say to people, - imaginary interlocutors, for I have nobody to talk to, - you think that 
the proposition that truth and justice are the greatest powers in this world, is metaphorical. 
Well, I, for my part, hold it to be true. No doubt Truth has to have defenders to uphold 
it. But truth creates its defenders and gives them strength. The mode in which the idea of 
truth influences the world is essentially the same as that in which my desire to have the fire 
poked causes me to get up and poke it. There is efficient causation and there is final, or ide- 
al, causation• If either of them is to be set down as a metaphor, it is rather the former. [8.272] 
But the being governed by a purpose or other final cause is the very essence of the psychical 
phenomenon, in general. [1.269] 
The mind works by final causation, and final causation is logical causation. Note, for 
example, the intimate bearing of logic upon grammatical syntax. Moreover, everything in 
the psychical sciences is inferential. [1.250, boldface added] 
Peirce suggests  an ana logy  be tween his three aspects o f  cosmic  evolution, 
Tychism, Synechism,  Agap i sm 
and his three kinds o f  human  logic, 
abduction,  induction, and deduction [el. 6 .144-145] .  
Tychism is a cosmic  general izat ion o f  abduction, and synechism o f  induc- 
tion, but the ana logy  f rom deduction to agapism is only suggestive. 
The r andom start o f  evolution is a cosmic  abduction, and both human  
and cosmic  tych ism are r andom searches. Peirce was an exponent  o f  the 
f requency theory  o f  inductive probability, and the continuous growth o f  
Synech i sm is a continuous generalization o f  the gradual convergence o f  
observed  relative frequencies toward the limit o f  a statistical sequence.  
A g a p i s m  refers to the role o f  final causes in evolution, and in the last 
quotat ion given above Peirce says that"f inal  causation is logical causation". 
He  also says 
•.. the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its 
conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attaehed to it,its 
Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these 
qualities play in an argument, they of course, play in the universe - that Universe being 
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precisely an argument. 
The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem - for every 
fine argument is a poem and a symphony -just  as every true poem is a sound argument. 
[5.1191 
The very being of the General, of Reason consists in its governing individual events. 
(1.615) 
Peirce called his own account  o f  evolution "objective logic because that 
conveys the correct  idea that it is like Hegel 's  logic" (1.444), and he 
thought  that Hegel ' s  logic was closer to deductive logic than to abduction 
and induction [5.436 and 6.218]. 
Agapism is the teleological force that steers the evolving universe 
toward an absolutely perfect,  rational, and symmetrical  form. This force 
is somewhat  analogous to the Platonic force o f  mathematical and value 
forms. 
. . .  the existing universe, with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an 
arbitrary determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our superior logic 
has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real universe, with its feebler 
logic, was inadequate. 
If this be correct, we cannot suppose the process of derivation, a process which extends 
from before time and from before logic, we cannot suppose that it began elsewhere than in 
the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality. 
The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but 
rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming 
developed. [6.192-194] 
Peirce is saying that cosmic Firsts are occurrences o f  specific universals 
(i.e., specific properties), and that as cosmic evolution proceeded,  final 
causality organized these specific universals into generic universals (natural 
classes). These generic universals then functioned as properties in natural 
laws. For  example,  different specific shades o f  red may  come to be grouped 
together as the identifying color o f  a species, and the quantity o f  mass 
becomes  a factor in the force o f  gravity. (Cf. Burks 1988b; 1990, pp. 
449-455)  
Thus in his formulation o f  the doctrine o f  final causation, Peirce is 
clearly returning to Plato's doctrine that the IDEAS - especially THE 
TRUE, THE GOOD, and THE BEAUTIFUL - have cosmic force, and 
also to Aristotle 's related doctrine o f  Final Causes. 
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PEIRCE'S PANPSYCHIC FIRSTS 
Peirce had two distinct philosophical theories of  evolution. The first was his 
semiotic-cognitive theory of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (Stage 
I), which he extended in Stage II to include his pragmatism. His second 
theory was the Stage III cosmic evolutionism of  Tychism-Synechism- 
Agapism, expounded in The Monist. This theory was augmented somewhat 
by his Stage IV pragmatieism. 
As we saw in the last section, Tychism is based on Peirce's concept 
of  an "unpersonalized feeling" or "cosmic First", and that is one of  the 
most difficult concepts in his philosophy. Surprisingly, an unpersonalized 
feeling or cosmic First is similar to what Immanuel Kant called a "sen- 
sation" or "the content of  a sense experience" (see the second section of 
this paper). However, Kant's sensations are limited to the human mind, 
whereas Peirce's unpersonalized feelings are also the most fundamental 
atoms or building blocks of the universe. This comparison is important for 
understanding Peirce's philosophical development, and so I will describe 
how Peirce expanded his semiotic-cosmic evolutionism of State I into his 
cosmic evolutionism of Stage III. 
In Stage I Peirce rejected Kant's thesis that there is a thing-in-itself 
(ding-an-sich) external to our minds that accounts for the basic content 
of  a perception of the external world. Peirce did this because on Kant's 
theory the relation of  a sensation to the thing-in-itself is unknowable. 
However, Peirce's rejection of the thing-in-itself left the cosmos without 
any constituent independent of human minds! That result in turn implied 
that both the environment and pre-human history are human constructions! 
And indeed, Peirce's semiotic-cognitive theory of  evolution of  Stages I and 
II is limited to human and social evolution. The theory says nothing about 
what happened before humans evolved! 
In Stage III Peirce expanded his evolutionary perspective dramatically 
by developing the cosmic evolutionism of  Tychism-Synechism--Agapism. 
This included the doctrine that unpersonalizedfeelings are the fundamental 
atoms of  the universe. 
... in the beginning - infinitely remote - there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, 
which being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence. This 
feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a 
generalizing tendency. [6.33, italics added] 
These "unpersonalized feelings" are also what Peirce calledpsycholbg- 
ical Firsts. He characterized them as follows: 
... feeling, the consciousness that can be included within an instant of time, passive con- 
sciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis. [1.377] 
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...  Feelings, comprising all that is immediately present, such as pain, blue, cheerful- 
ness, the feeling that arises when we contemplate a consistent theory, etc. A feeling is a 
state of mind having its own living quality, independent of any other state of mind. A feeling 
is necessarily perfectly simple, for if it had parts these would also be in the mind, whenever 
the whole was present, and thus the whole would not monopolize the mind . . . .  [He added 
a footnote:] A feeling may certainly be compound, but only in virtue of a perception which 
is not that feeling nor any feeling at all. [6•18] 
Peirce is talking here about external feelings such as colors, shapes, and 
sounds, as well as internal feelings. 
Any  flash o f  experience with some specific quality (perhaps vague) is 
an example o f  a psychological first, whatever the source o f  the experience. 
Suppose, for example, that you glance momentarily and seem to see a 
brownish spread without defined boundaries. This is a psychological First, 
whether it was caused by an actual table top, occurred in a dream, or 
resulted from a physician tickling your brain. 
Peirce said explicitly that these psychological Firsts are the atomic 
building blocks o f  the cosmos: 
We can hardly but suppose that those sense-qualities that we now experience, colors, odors, 
sounds, feelings of every description, loves, griefs, surprise, are but the relics of an ancient 
mined continuum of qualities, like a few columns standing here and there in testimony 
that here some old-world forum with its basilica and temples had once made a magnificent 
ensemble. [6.197, bold-face added] 
Remember  that for Peirce 
•.. time consists in a regularity in the relations of interacting feelings• The first chaos 
consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated feelings . . . .  these feelings had no relations, 
for relations are general. [8.318] 
The concept o f  a psychological First is derived from human psychology, 
but the role o f  psychological Firsts in the tychistic origin o f  the universe 
is very different from their role in the human mind, so when talking about 
them in their cosmic role I call them "cosmic Firsts". Thus human psy- 
chological Firsts are both cosmic Firsts and our source o f  the concept of  
a cosmic First. And since cosmic Firsts are the fundamental atoms of  the 
universe, we humans directly experience instances o f  cosmic atoms! 
[This is another example of  how the relational structure o f  Peirce's 
philosophy ambiguates his use o f  terms. The word "feelings" plays two 
very different roles in his philosophy, for it may  refer to the basic atoms of  
the universe or to the atoms of  the human mind.] 
Peirce called his philosophy objective idealism, and that name distin- 
guishes it from Berkeley's subjective idealism. Objective idealism is a form 
350 ARTHUR W. BURKS 
ofpanpsychim, the view that all objects of the universe are constituted of 
basic feelings and their interrelations. 
Peirce's identity of psychological and cosmic Firsts is the essence of 
his panpsychism, and so to connect Peirce's philosophical ideology to the 
mainstream of philosophy I will call both psychological Firsts and cosmic 
Firsts panpsychic Firsts. Panpsychic Firsts are, of course, very different 
from, and much more basic than, such other Peircean Firsts as iconic signs 
and abductive arguments. 
Section 2 of this paper was entitled "Humans Have no Faculty of Intuition" 
because the questions Peirce asked in his 1868-69 Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy series were about this presumed Kantian faculty. Kant said that 
Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are 
thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. [Kant 1933, 
p. 65] 
To see how intuitions and concepts enter into cognition, we will analyze 
an example. 
Suppose a person perceives a brown, rectangular table. Kant would 
analyze this percept into four factors: 
(1) The thing-in-itself (ding-an-sich) causes 
(2) the sensation of a table in the observer's mind. 
(3) The perceived shape of the table results from the interaction of 
the sensation and the mind's innate form of spatial intuition. 
(4) The concept of the table as a thing results from the interaction of 
the spatially organized sensation and the mind's innate category 
of substance. 
We can now compare Peirce's analysis of perception with Kant's, factor 
by factor. 
(1) Peirce had nothing like the thing-in-itself. Indeed, his main objective 
in Stage I of  his thought was to give an account of knowledge without 
using the idea of something beyond experience that causes our intuitive 
experiences. 
(3) Peirce held space to be a complex relational structure and hence a 
Third. 
(4) A substance is an organization of properties, and every organization 
is a Third. 
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This leaves factor (2), the bare sensation of the table in the observor's 
mind, not including its spatial boundaries and without being conceived 
as a thing. But this unstructured sensation is very similar to a Peircean 
psychological First, and thus to an unpersonalized feeling. 
Despite this similarity with respect to factor (2) of  perception, Peirce's 
theory of  the other three factors is radically different from Kant's. Consider, 
for example, the fact that human percepts vary widely from one experience 
to another. What accounts for this variation? Kant's answer would be that 
the ding-an-sich accounts for it. But the ding-an-sich is not observable, 
and so on Kant's philosophy there can be no explanation of the differences 
among experiences. More generally, Kant's theory of  perception cannot 
account for the observed variety in the universe, t And as we saw in the 
section "Tychism", Peirce rejected all such theories on the ground that they 
"block the way of  inquiry". 
Peirce's panpsychism does explain the variation among human percep- 
tions. The perceiver and the perceived environment belong to the same 
metaphysical system and so their basic atoms and laws are the same. 
Consider a table, the intervening environment, and the percipient's body 
and mind. These are all constructed of  panpsychic feelings, and the laws 
connecting them are reducible to laws governing panpsychic feelings. For 
Peirce, then, perception involves interactions of  compounds of  panpsychic 
Firsts in accordance with the natural laws governing these interactions. In 
contrast, Kant's theory of  perception involves two metaphysically differ- 
ent kinds of  entities, the ding-an-sich and the human mind, and the laws 
governing their interactions are unknowable to humans. 
Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism is probabilistically constructive, 
for it derives the nature of  the universe from an initial chaos of  cosmic atoms 
(panpsychic Firsts), using probabilities in the derivation. Thus Peirce's 
explanation of  the variety in human perceptions goes all the way back to 
the start of  the eosmos in an initial chaos of panpsychic Firsts. 
... in the beginning - infinitely remote - there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, 
which being without connection or regularity, would properly be without existence. (6.33) 
By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always 
and everwhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal 
departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all 
the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really sui generis 
and new can be accounted for. 
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• .. my hypothesis of spontaneity [Tychism] does explain irregularity, in a certain sense; 
that is, it explains the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what each lawless 
event is to be. At the same time, by thus loosening the bond of necessity, it gives room for 
the influence of another kind of causation [final causation, or Thirdness], such as seems to 
be operative in the mind in the formation of associations, and enables us to understand how 
the uniformity of nature could have been brought about. [6.59-60] 
Looked at in the reverse direction, from the indefinitely far future to 
the indefinitely far past, Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism isprob- 
abilistically reductive. In this broad sense of "reductive" it is similar to 
earlier materialistic and mechanistic philosophies, though these were non- 
probabilistic. My own philosophy of logical mechanism, influenced by 
Peirce, is evolutionararily and probabilistically reductive (Burks 1986, 
1990, 1995). 
It is philosophically important that Peirce's constructive panpsychism 
has a big advantage over reductive materialisms and mechanisms in explain- 
ing the nature of consciousness. For human feelings are direct constituents 
of consciousness, whereas physical components are not. Furthermore, 
panpsychic feelings provide a mental basis for Peirce's panpsychic God. 
We go back now to Stage II of Peirce's thought, his pragmatism, and 
from there to his stage IV modification of it, pragmaticism. 
PRAGMATISM 
I outlined the four successive doctrines of Peirce's intellectual evolution at 
the beginning of this paper: 
(I) The doctrine that man is a sign in an infinite semiotic and 
inferential process 
(II) Pragmatism 
(!II) Cosmic evolutionism: Tychism-Synechism--Agapism 
(IV) The realism of"would-be's" and the generalization of pragma- 
tism to pragmaticism. 
Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism is the synthesis of these four 
doctrines. 
We have covered (I) and seen how Peirce generalized from it to (III). 
But as we saw near the end of the section "Man's Glassy Essence", doctrine 
(I) yields only theoretical or limiting definitions of "truth" and "reality", 
in terms of an infinite semiotic process. Doctrine I does not yield practical 
definitions of"truth" and "reality". Since Peirce's pragmatism is based on 
scientific method, one would expect it to fill this gap. It does so, though 
only partly. 
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In about 1873, Peirce began to develop pragmatism in chapter drafts 
of  a book, "Logic". These drafts were first published in 1958 (Collected 
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce 7.313-361). Peirce published the doctrine 
in the Popular Science Monthly (1877-78) as a series of  papers, under the 
general title "Illustrations of  the Logic of  Science": 
"The Fixation of  Belief" [5.358-387] 
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear" [5.388-410] 
"The Doctrine of  Chances" [2.645-660] 
"The Probability of  Induction" [2.669-693] 
"The Order of  Nature" [6.395-4273] 
"Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" [2.619-644]. 
These papers constitute an advanced textbook on logic, together with 
Peirce's philosophical foundations of  the subject. 
"The Fixation of  Belief" describes several methods of  fixing belief and 
argues that the observational and experimental methods of  science consti- 
tute the best of  these. "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" contains Peirce's 
famous pragmatic maxim: 
... there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible differ- 
ence of practice. [5.400] 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we con- 
ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. [5.402, boldface added] 
... the ideas of truth and falsehood, in their full development, appertain exclusively to 
the scientific method of settling opinion. [5.406] 
To illustrate the pragmatic method of  inquiry, Peirce described several 
investigators, each using a different method to measure the velocity of  
light. 
They may at first obtain different results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, 
the results are found to move steadily together toward a destined centre. So with all scientific 
research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of 
investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. 
[5.407] 
Thus Peirce's pragmatism was an analysis of  the nature of  scientific veri- 
fication and the recommendation of  it as a norm. His paper on the theory 
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of  the economy of  research [7.139--157] at about the same time was an 
extension of  this analysis to encompass the economy of inquiry. 
However, Peirce was not using "belief" in the ordinary sense in "The 
Fixation of  Belief". For immediately after formulating pragmatism in 
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear" at 5.402, he considered the belief "this 
diamond was hard" for the case of  a diamond that had been destroyed 
without ever having been tested for hardness. He then said 
There is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are 
not brought to the test. [5,403] 
A practical person would say that this is not so, for tests show that diamonds 
are hard, and had this particular diamond been tested it would have been 
found to be hard. But this is not true of  soft things. 
Moreover, such counterfactual beliefs are foundational to morality 
(Burks 1946a). Suppose a person fails to act so as to carry out a moral 
duty, and the consequences of  his not carrying out his duty are bad. In 
evaluating this situation, one would say, "Had he acted morally the bad 
result would not have occurred". But applying Peirce's interpretation of 
the untested diamond to this example, one could equally well say, "Had he 
acted morally it would have made no difference"! 
Peirce's difficulty here is that his 1878 concepts of  truth and reality 
were not really applicable to single cases, or even to finite sequences of  
cases, but only to those infinite sequences that have limits (Burks 1977, 
sec. 3.4.2, 1980). This was true of  his 1868 definitions [5.311], and his 
1878 definitions are essentially the same: 
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we 
mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real, [5.407] 
We have seen that Peirce mixed two kinds of  philosophical materials in 
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear": a characterization of  scientific method, 
and philosophical theses about it. The last four papers of  the series contain 
the same interesting mixture. These papers are devoted to the three kinds of  
logical reasoning - deduction, induction, hypothesis (abduction) - and to 
philosophical issues such as the uniformity of  nature and the interpretation 
of  probability. 
Thus Peirce thought his pragmatic method of  inquiry rested on concepts 
of  truth and reality that presuppose an infinite sequence of inquirers. The 
same is true of  his analysis of  inductive logic. He held the frequency theory 
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of  probability, which defines the probability of  a property as its relative 
frequency in an infinite sequence of events, and he drew the obvious 
conclusion from this theory: 
An individual inference must be either true or false, and can show no effect of probability; 
and, therefore in reference to a single case considered in itself, probability can have no 
meaning. [2.652, "The Doctrine of Chances"] 
But, in fact, applications of  probability and statistics are always to finite 
situations. 
Peirce's putative solution to this problem was the same as in the case 
of ordinary empirical statements, to appeal to the infinite community of 
investigators. Thus he said in "The Doctrine of  Chances": 
. . .  logicality inexorably requires that our interests not  be limited. They must not stop at 
our own fate, but must embrace the whole community . . .  Logic is rooted in the social 
principle. [2.654] 
Now this is a possible rule for conduct, but it doesn't give pragmatic 
meaning to any actual application of probability. 
lit is worth noting that an infinite probabilistic sequence is a very simple 
model of  Peirce's Stage I infinite inferential process. The limiting relative 
frequency of the sequence represents the truth, and each observed relative 
frequency represents the opinion of the moment. These simple probabilistic 
models of  Stage II presage Peirce's Stage III doctrine of  Tychism.] 
In the fourth paper of  the Popular Science Monthly seri~s, Peirce con- 
sidered the main alternative to the frequency theory of probability, what he 
called "the conceptualistic theory". (This theory is also called the "a priori 
theory of  probability" - cf. Burks 1977, secs. 5.7 & 10.5.) It holds that 
probability is "the degree of belief which ought to attach to a proposition" 
[2.673]. Peirce rejected this theory, saying 
The relative probability of this or that arrangement of Nature is something which we should 
have a fight to talk about if universes were as plenty as blackberries, if we could put a 
quantity of them in a bag, shake them well up, draw out a sample, and examine them 
to see what proportion of them had one arrangement and what proportion another. But, 
even in that case, a higher universe would contain us, in regard to whose arrangements the 
conception of probability could have no applicability. [2.684] 
But we will see in a moment  that Peirce did accept the reality of  sets of  
possible universes when he advocated the reality of"would-be 's" in Stage 
IV. 
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PRAGMATICISM 
Peirce's pragmatic characterization of scientific method is excellent. But 
his pragmatic philosophy of science is a curious mixture of extreme nom- 
inalism (denying hardness to an untestable diamond) and extreme real- 
ism (defining truth and reality in terms of an assumed infinite history of 
inquiry)! Since neither doctrine is practical, his Stage II philosophy of 
science was only partly pragmatic. Peirce resolved this conflict in Stage 
IV by abandoning the nominalism and adopting his realistic doctrine o f  
"would-be's ". He also made his pragmatism more reformist by his doc- 
trine o f  "concrete reasonableness ". These two doctrines made his stage 
IV pragmatism very different from his Stage II pragmatism, and so Peirce 
renamed his theorypragmaticism. 
I will make some preliminary points as background for our discussion 
of pragmaticism. 
The concept of final causality is derived from the purposiveness dis- 
played by all living things, and Peirce was especially interested in what 
I will call human conscious-planned-rationalgoal-seeking. Peirce's prag- 
matic analysis of inquiry is a partial analysis of this concept. A person has 
a goal and works out a plan or strategy for achieving it. The person gathers 
information, makes a model of the situation, acts, observes the result, and 
then repeatedly cycles this procedure, often modifying the strategy or even 
the goal in the process. Peirce's derivation of pragmatism from inquiry 
yielded a theory of goal-seeking, and his work on the economy of research 
was a further development of this theory [7.139-161]. 
Consider now Peirce's theory of would-be's. I think this theory follows 
from his Agapism, the doctrine that final causes guide evolution towards 
a supreme value goal. For a purpose, whether human or cosmic, is dispo- 
sitional. It can operate in many different circumstances, and when it fails 
to operate it may be the case that i f  it had operated then the goal would 
have been reached. Hence goal-direetedness, either that of a human or the 
cosmos, implies the reality of"would-be's" or potentialities. 
Finally, it should be noted that Peirce's Stage III Agapism and his 
Stage IV realism provide a metaphysical basis for his Stage I and Stage 
II definitions of "truth" and "reality". Both definitions presuppose that 
there will be an infinite history of inquiry that converges to a limit. This 
presupposition is supplied by the would-be aspect of cosmic final causality, 
which guarantees that history will continue indefinitely and approach a 
limit. Thus Peirce's pragmaticism helps integrate the first three stages of 
his thought into a single system. 
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As we saw in the preceding section, Peirce interpreted a statement like 
This diamond is harder than steel 
nominalistically, in terms of material implication, which was the only kind 
of implication that had been formalized at that time. On this interpretation 
o f " i f . . ,  then . . .  ", the statement 
If this diamond is rubbed by steel, then it will be scratched 
is logically equivalent to 
EITHER the diamond is NOT rubbed by steel OR it is scratched. 
Hence if the diamond is never tested, the sentence is true, independently of  
the dispositional properties of  diamonds and steel. Thus on Peirce's Stage 
II interpretation, the sentence If this diamond is rubbed by steel, it will be 
scratched does not entail such subjunctive conditionals as 
If this diamond WERE rubbed with the point of  a steel knife, 
then it WOULD NOT be scratched. 
As we noted earlier, Peirce said in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", 
There is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are 
not brought to the test. [5.403, 1878] 
On this nominalist interpretation, the sentence "This diamond is harder 
than steel" is only a summary of actual facts, and says nothing about 
contrary-to-fact possibilities. 
It is worth noting that in the 1930s and 1940's many logical posi- 
tivists and naturalists took Peirce's pragmatic criterion of  meaning and his 
statements about the untested diamond statement to show that he was an 
early logical postivist. Some of  them also held that Peirce's philosophy was 
schizophrenic- an untenable mixture of clear philosophy and metaphysics. 
In 1905 and 1906, Peirce published three articles on pragmaticism in 
The Monist .  The second of these begins with a reformulation of  his 1878 
definition of  pragmatism, which we quoted a few pages back, but now he 
calls it "pragmaticism" rather than "pragmatism": 
Pragmaticism was originally enounced [in 5.402, 1878] in the form of a maxim, as follows: 
Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the 
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objects of  your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of  
your conception of the object. [5.438] 
Later in the paper Peirce reviews his 1878 discussion of the diamond and 
reverses his conclusion: 
. . .  classification is true or false, and the generals to which it refers are either reals in the 
one case, or figments in the other . . . ,  the question is, not what didhappen, b u t . . ,  whether 
that diamond wouMresist an attempt to scratch it . . . .  [5.4533] 
Thus in Stage IV of his thought Peirce wanted his pragmaticism to 
encompass and promote the rational fulfillment of purposes. Since pur- 
poses and final causes are dispositional, he shifted from his nominalist 
summary-of-fact interpretation of conditional statements to a realist and 
dispositional interpretation. He now said that causal statements express 
causal potentialities, or "would-be's': 
. . .  the will be 's, the actually is 's, and the have been's are not the sum of  the reals. They 
only cover actuality. There are besides would be's and can be's that are real . . . .  
It can certainly be proved very clearly that the Universe does contain both would be's 
and can be's. [8.216-217, c. 1910] 
My modal logic of causal statements was the first formal logic of causal 
conditionals, or what Peirce called "would be's" (Burks 1951a; Burks 
1977, Chapters 6 & 7). I constructed this system to elucidate the logic of 
such statements, and to justify their use in moral contexts (Burks 1946a). 
Causal implication is logically stronger than material implication, the kind 
of implication Peirce assumed in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". A modal 
logic is a logic of possible universes, and my logic of causal statements 
is a logic of causally possible universes. Thus Peirce's doctrine of"would 
be's" implies the reality of possible universes he denied when he said that 
universes are not "as plenty as blackberries" [2.684]. 
Correspondingly, Peirce moved in Stage IV from his Stage II nominalist 
theory of frequency probability to a realist and dispositional theory of 
probability: 
• . .  the statement that the probability, that i r a  die be thrown from a dice box it will turn up 
a number divisible by three, is one-third . . .  means that the die has a certain "would be"; 
and to say that a die has a "would-be" is to say that it has a property, quite analogous to 
any habit that a man might have. Only the "would-be" of  the die is presumably as much 
simpler and more definite than the man's habit as the die's homogeneous composition and 
cubical shape is simpler than the nature of  the man's nervous system and soul . . . .  [2.664] 
My own theories of probability, induction, and causality were influenced 
by Peirce, both positively and in reaction to his theories. See my Chance, 
Cause, Reason (1977). Peirce's frequency theory of probability and his 
later dispositional-frequency theory are analyzed in Chapters 3 and 8. My 
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theory of  inductive probability is developed in Chapters 4 and 5, and is 
based on my calculus o f  choice. This is a graphical logic relevant to human 
conscious-planned rational goal-seeking. Choice trees are used to represent 
alternative strategies or plans of  action, and a strategy is chosen by marking 
a choice tree in accordance with a set of  rules that entail the applicability 
of  probability theory. Interestingly, Peirce devoted his third Monist article 
on pragmaticism [4.530-572] to a graphical logic for deductive reasoning 
and the concept of  logical necessity (Roberts 1973). 
We are now ready to discuss Peirce's concept of  concrete reasonableness. 
Throughout his whole career Peirce developed the logic of  reasoning and 
advocated its use. His pragmatiSM was a logic for achieving the goal of  
human knowledge. His pragmatlCISM held that concrete reasonableness 
is the goal of  cosmic evolution, and Peirce advocated that human reason 
be used to further this goal. 
[According to pragmaticism] the only ultimate good is ... to further the development of 
concrete reasonableness, so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual 
reactions at all, but in the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development. 
[5.3, 1902; italics added] 
[Tile meaning of a statement lies in the infinite future.] Accordingly, the pragmaticist 
does not make the surnmum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that 
process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals 
[that we call] reasonable. In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more 
largely through self-control, and this gives the pragmatieist a sort of justification for 
making the rational purport to be general. [5.433, 1905; boldface added] 
Thus in the last stage of  his philosophy Peirce found the meaning of  
symbols to consist in how they contribute to cosmic goal-achievement. 
It is interesting that Peirce, the founder of  pragmatism, began with a 
narrow goal, the improvement of  human inquiry, and ended with a very 
broad goal, the extolling of  human rational goal-seeking as a stage of  
cosmic goal-seeking or final causality. He then drew a moral implication, 
that humans should improve the skills that are relevant to rational goal- 
seeking. What the pragmaticist 
adores, if he is a good pragmaticist, is power; not the sham power of brute force, which, 
even in its own specialty of spoiling things, secures such slight results; but the creative 
power of reasonableness, which subdues all other powers, and rules over them with its 
sceptre, knowledge, and its globe, love. [5.520] 
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I want to make two comments on this quotation, a short one conceming 
Peirce's last attempt to contribute to the goal of  rational goal-seeking, and 
a longer one concerning his contrast between "the sham power of brute 
force" and "the creative power of reasonableness". 
For Peirce, logic was always the preeminent tool for rationality, and 
in Stage IV he sought to improve its effectiveness by developing a triad 
of  normative sciences: aesthetics as First, ethics as Second, and logic as 
Third. But he never worked out such a normative system, or even made 
clear what it would be like [8.255--257] (cf. Burks 1943). I think John 
Dewey's pragmatism can be viewed as achieving the goal Peirce had in 
mind. Dewey used aesthetics, ethics, logic, epistemology, and a theory 
of human nature normatively, and he encouraged the use of  reason in 
education and in social and political matters, with considerable effect. In 
the process he contributed to the development of social psychology, which 
he regarded as a tool for human progress. 
Finally, consider Peirce's contrast between the "sham power of brute 
force" and the "creative power of  reasonableness". This is a basic example 
of  his categories- brute force is Second, reason is above it as Third. Human 
desires, interests, specific goals, and volitions are Seconds; reasoning, 
inquiry, theorizing, and ideals are Thirds. Thirds are better than Seconds, 
and will ultimately dominate them. This asymmetry is part of Peirce's 
explanation of  how evolution has generated humans from lower forms, 
and he took this achievement of evolution as empirical evidence for the 
asymmetry. 
Peirce showed great insight in seeing that logic plays a basic role in 
evolution. But since he wrote on evolution, an alternative logic of evolution 
has become well-established, the Mendelian logic of genetic programs. 
This logic is discrete in contrast to the continuous logic of Synechism, and 
it gives a much better account of the progress of evolution than Peirce's 
logic. My own logical-mechanical theory of evolution is based on discrete 
Mendelian probabilistic logic rather than on Peirce's logic of continuity 
(Synechism) and his doctrine of final causality (Agapism) (Burks 1988a, 
1988b; 1990, sec. 4; 1995). 
Peirce held that the "sham power of brute force" competes with the 
"creative power of reasonableness", and that in the long run the latter will 
dominate. In contrast, Mendelian evolution treats the factors of desire- 
volition and experience-reason as independent interacting forces. These 
two factors constantly interact, with the desire factor setting the goals and 
observation and reason being employed in achieving them. This analysis 
yields a much better account of thc enduring nature of evil and its relation 
to good than does Peirce's theory. This analysis is also the basis for a 
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much better explanation of the tragedy of Peirce's own life: the extreme 
contrast between his great achievements and his deep frustrations. He had 
unbounded faith in the power of reason over desire, though desire often 
dominated reason in his own life. 
We turn now to Peirce's views on God, which he sometimes connected 
to his pragmaticism [6.480-485, 6.502-503]. 
SOME CONCEPTS OF GOD 
Charles Peirce (1839-1914) was a committed Christian. He was raised a 
New England Congregationalist, became an Episcopalian to marry Melusi- 
na Fay in 1862, and wrote considerably about religion in the last two stages 
of his thought. He was always religous in belief, and his religous beliefs 
played a very important role in his philosophizing. 
Peirce was not religous in behavior- he did not go to church much, and 
he conspicuously violated the existing socio-religious rules of morality 
and proper conduct. He was not unique in this, of course, but he was 
more conspicuous than most men in his violations, much to his personal 
detriment and that of his two wives, Melusina and Juliette. 
Nevertheless Peirce directed his philosophy toward reconciling religion 
with Darwinian evolution, and I think he gave the best reconciliation in 
existence at that time. Moreover, his theory of the origin of the universe 
explained creation as a gradual and scientifically understandable process, 
rather than as an ad hoc creation by divine fiat. Peirce very much wanted a 
regular position in a college or university so he could work with students 
and teach his views. Unfortunately, the people who controlled those posi- 
tions did not understand his accomplishments, and he was not acceptable 
to them because of his behavior. 
Though he was a Christian, Peirce incorporated aspects of other reli- 
gions in his philosophy. He begins "The Law of Mind": 
. . .  tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities 
of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned 
idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. I may 
mention, for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental biographies, that I 
was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord - I mean in Cambridge - at the time 
when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught 
from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehrn, or from God knows what minds 
stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held 
many an antispetic against Concord transendentalism; and I am not conscious of having 
contracted any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some 
benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and that now, after long 
incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by training 
in physical investigations. (6.103) 
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Concre t e  reasonableness ,  the goal  state o f  Pe i rce ' s  T y c h i s m - S y n e c h i s m -  
A g a p i s m  is pe rhaps  a rat ional  vers ion  o f  the H indu  and Buddh i s t  state o f  
Ni rvana .  
The  G o d  o f  Chris t iani ty  is a G o d  o f  Love ,  and  the last o f  Pe i rce ' s  1 8 9 1 -  
93 Moni s t  papers  is enti t led "Evo lu t iona ry  L o v e "  [6 .287-317] .  In  it Pei rce  
deve lops  his vers ion  o f  divine love - co smic  t e l eo logy  - wh ich  he calls 
A g a p i s m .  H e  begins  b y  p reach ing  Saint  J o h n ' s  doctr ine that G o d  is love. 
Philosophy, when just escaping from its golden pupaskin, mythology, proclaimed the great 
evolutionary agency of the universe to be Love. 
[Saint John said] "We know and have trusted the love which God hath in us. God is love." 
There is no logic in this, unless it means that God loves all men. [John had said earlier] 
"God is light and in him is no darkness at all." We are to understand, then, that as darkness 
is merely the defect of light, so hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of [agape] and 
[agathos], love and loveliness. 
. . .  
Thus, the love that God is, is not a love of which hatred is the contrary; otherwise Satan 
would be a coordinate power; but it is a love which embraces hatred as all imperfect stage 
of it, an Anteros - yea, even needs hatred and hatefulness as its object. For self-love is no 
love; so if God's self is love, that which he loves must be defect of love; just as a luminary 
can light up only that which otherwise would be dark. 
The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting creations into 
independency and drawing them into harmony. This seems complicated when stated so; 
but it is fully summed up in the simple formula we call the Golden Rule . . . .  [This] says, 
Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor. 
It is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, but by 
cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we draw 
from John's gospel is that this is the way the mind develops; and as for the cosmos, only 
so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love, recognizing 
germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life and makes it lovely. That is 
the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay "The Law of Mind" [the third 
paper of the series] must see that synechism calls for. [6.287-289] 
This  pa s sage  sounds  as i f  Pei rce  wro te  it in a state o f  ecstasy,  and in any  
case  it contradic ts  p ragmat i ca l ly  Pe i rce ' s  pe rsona l  behavior.  
T h o u g h  Pei rce  was  emot iona l ly  c o m m i t t e d  to re l igous  be l i e f  (see Brent  
1993), one  o f  his a ims  (like that  o f  his fr iend Wil l iam James)  was  to p rov ide  
an empir ica l  and  rat ional  basis  for  bo th  a concep t  o f  G o d  and a be l i e f  that  
G o d  as so -conce ived  is real. To evaluate his success  I ' l l  c o m p a r e  his v iews  
on  G o d  wi th  the s tandard  Chris t ian alternatives. 
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The concept of  God is a difficult concept. God is infinite in reason, 
goodness, and power. But he cannot be infinite in the sense that some 
numbers and quantities are infinite, for there is no largest mathematical 
infinite. There is also the problem of  the existence of  evil. God is unlimited 
in his creative powers and his goodness, and yet the universe he created 
contains much evil. Evil is sometimes explained as the work of  the devil, 
but then the relation of  God to the devil is problematic. 
We usually conceive of  God by analogy with ourselves, but no one has 
ever constructed a logic for analogizing from the finite to the infinite. We 
think of  creation on the model of  a human creator - an artist creating a 
painting, a musician a concerto, a potter a vase. But these are all cases of 
a finite creator using available materials to form a finite object, whereas 
God is an infinite creator needing no materials. 
My undergraduate philosophy teachers were both Methodist ministers 
with doctorates in philosophy. Theologically they were "personalists", 
holding that God is an infinite person who created the universe of space, 
time, and finite objects, including humans. God may intervene in the cos- 
mos from time to time, miracles and mystical experiences being examples. 
Personalism is a form of  theism. 
Gottfried Leibniz's monadology was a highly organized theism. God is 
an infinite monad, who created infinitely many finite monads that constitute 
the created world. A human soul is a monad capable of  consciousness, and 
the spatial and temporal organization of its experiences is subjective. God 
predetermined the experiential history of every monad so that all monads 
behave as if they are interacting, though none can influence any other. Thus 
each monad mirrors or models the universe to a degree corresponding to 
its apparent interactions with other monads. A human's concept of  God is 
a specific example of  this mirroring, and whether or not a person believes 
in God is predetermined by God. Leibniz's pre-determinism is, of  course, 
the extreme opposite of  Peirce's Tychism. 
Both personalism and Leibniz's monadology view God as one substance 
and the world he created (the world we know) as another substance or 
complex of  substances. This underlying metaphysics is characteristic of  
theism. In contrast, pantheism treats God and the universe we know as one 
substance. "God is all, and all is God". The difference between God and the 
universe then becomes the difference between fundamental aspects of  God, 
a difference in global properties rather than in substances, or a difference 
between the whole and its parts: God is eternal and infinite, while each 
particular thing is a transient part of  God. Peirce was a pantheist, but before 
presenting his version I'll describe some previous forms of  pantheism. 
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Emanationism is an early form of pantheism, in which creation takes 
the form of a series of emanations from God. God first emanates the 
transcendent realm of intellect and Platonic ideas, then human minds and 
souls, and finally the lowest forms of reality: space-time, animals, plants, 
and plain matter. Each new level is lower than the preceeding level in both 
degree of reality and degree of perfection. Indeed, in this theology, reality 
and perfection are intrinsically correlated, for successive emanations obey 
the metaphysical principle that a cause must have as much reality and value 
as its effect. Most standard arguments for God's existence flow from this 
principle (Burks !988b, p. 337). 
We can illustrate the difference between theism and pantheism by com- 
paring the views of Descartes and Spinoza. In Descartes' theistic meta- 
physics, God is the supreme substance who created a world of two interact- 
ing kinds of sub stance: mental and material. Spinoza replaced this structure 
by a single substance having God (natura naturans) and Nature (natural 
naturata) as two basic aspects. As he expressed it, he divided 
• . .  the whole of Nature into Natura naturans and Natura naturata. By Natura naturans we 
understand a being that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, without needing 
anything other than i t s e l f . . . ,  that is, God . . .  
We shall divide Natura naturata in two: a universal and a particular. The universal 
consists in all those modes which depend on God immedia te ly . . .  The particular consists 
in all those singular things which are produced by the universal modes. So Natura naturata 
requires some substances in order to be conceived properly. 
But as far as the thing itself is concerned, I think I have demonstrated clearly and evi- 
dently enough that the intellect, though infinite, pertains to Natura naturata, not to Natura 
naturans. 
By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an 
infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence. 
Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God. 
(Curley 1994, pp. 57-8, 81, 85, 94) 
Georg Hegel was the main founder of absolute idealism, and he was a 
pantheist. We'll see in a moment that Peirce's pantheism was influenced 
by his. 
PEIRCE'S CONCEPT OF GOD 
Peirce, as a pantheist, thought God and the cosmos constituted one sub- 
stance. To introduce his views we will trace the philosophic theme that 
runs through all four stages of his thought: the cosmos is an infinite semi- 
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otic goal-directed evolutionary process that converges on the good and the 
real. 
In  S tage  I he  e x p r e s s e d  it: 
. . .  every thought must be interpreted in another, [and] all thought is in signs. . .  [5.253] 
. . .  MAN IS A SIGN . . . . . .  the man is the thought. [5.3t4] 
. . .  reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community.... [5.316] 
In  S tage  I I  he  said 
• . .  the ideas of truth and falsehood, in their full development appertain exclusively to the 
scientific method of settling opinion. [5.406] 
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what 
we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. [5.407] 
S tages  I and  I I  o f  Pe i r ce ' s  intel lectual  evolu t ion  f o r m  a uni t  in that  bo th  
are abou t  h u m a n  semiot ic  evolut ion.  Stages  I I I  and  I V  f o r m  a uni t  in that  
bo th  are  abou t  co smic  evolut ion.  
In  S tage  I I I  Pe i rce  found  c o s m i c  evolu t ion  to be  a h ierarchica l  p roces s  
wi th  three  aspects :  
- Tych i sm,  the doct r ine  that  probabi l i s t ic  laws  are basic ,  and  de te rmin-  
istic l aws  are l imi t ing  cases  o f  these  
- S y n e c h i s m ,  the doct r ine  that  rea l i ty  is a con t inuous  evo lu t iona ry  
p rocess ,  m o v i n g  f r o m  a state o f  comp le t e  r a n d o m n e s s  toward  per -  
fect  regula r i ty  
- A g a p i s m ,  the doct r ine  that  co smic  evolu t ion  is goal -d i rec ted .  
• . .  the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its 
• conclusions in living realities. 
The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem . . .  [5.119] 
The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but 
rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming 
developed. [6.194] 
In  S tage  I V  Pe i rce  r e fo rmu la t ed  and  r e n a m e d  his p r a g m a t i s m :  
[According to pragmaticism] the only ultimate good is . . .  to further the development of 
concrete reasonableness, so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual 
reactions at all, but in the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development. 
[5.3, 1902; italics added] 
H u m a n  p u r p o s i v e n e s s  is on ly  a specia l  case  o f  final causa l i ty  or  co smic  
pu rpos ivenes s :  
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It i s . . .  a widespread error to think that a "final cause" is necessarily a purpose. A purpose 
is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experience. [ 1.211; el. 8.272] 
. . .  ideas are not all mere creations of this or that mind, but on the contrary have a 
power of finding or creating their vehicles, and having found them, of conferring upon 
them the ability to transform the face of the earth. [1.217] 
The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but 
rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming 
developed. [6.194] 
Pe i r ce ' s  evo lu t ionary  p ragmat ic  ideal ism was  a radica l ly  n e w  fo rm o f  
pan the i sm.  H e  rep laced  the theis t ' s  idea o f  a "one - sho t "  creat ion o f  the 
wor ld  b y  the gradual  crea t ion o f  the wor ld  th rough  the evo lu t ionary  p rocess  
o f  T y c h i s m - S y n e c h i s m - A g a p i s m .  He  though t  o f  cosmic  evolut ion as a 
divine learning process .  Chance ,  continuity,  and  cosmic  purposes  are all 
aspects  o f  God ,  and  w e  h u m a n s  are parts o f  this infinite evo lu t ionary  divine 
sys tem.  
Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast 
consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Diety relative to us. I do not 
approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, 
that has the advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond 
that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service . . . .  [5.107] 
The word "God", so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is the definable proper name, sig- 
nifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. 
[6.452] 
In  an  unpub l i shed  paPer,  "Answers  to Ques t ions  C o n c e m i n g  M y  Be l i e f  
in G o d "  ( 6 . 4 9 4 - 5 2 1 ,  c. 1906), Peirce  appea led  to instinct  or  faith (a f o r m  
o f  Firstness):  
. . .  the discoveries of science, their enabling us topredict what will be the course of nature, 
is proof conclusive that, though we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a 
fragment of His Thought, as it were. 
Now such being the pragmaticist's answer to the question what he means by the word 
"God", the question whether there really is such a being is the question whether all physical 
science is merely the figment - the arbitrary figment - of the students of nature, and 
further whether the one lesson the Gautama Boodha [sic], Confucius, Socrates, and all 
who from any point of view have had their ways of conduct determined by meditation 
upon the physico-psychical universe, be only their arbitrary notion or be the Truth behind 
the appearances which the frivolous man does not think of; and whether the superhuman 
courage which such contemplation has conferred upon priests who go to pass their lives 
with lepers and refuse all offers &rescue is mere silly fanaticism, the passion of a baby, or 
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whether it is strength derived from the power of truth. Now the only guide to the answer 
to this question lies in the power of the passion of love which more or less overmasters 
every agnostic scientist and everybody who seriously and deeply considers the tmiverse. 
But whatever there may be of argument in all this is as nothing, the merest nothing, 
in comparison to its force as an appeal to one's own instinct, which is to argument what 
substance is to shadow, what bed-rock is to the built foundations of a cathedral. [6.502-505] 
When asked "Do you believe this Supreme Being to have been the 
creator of  the universe?" he answered "Not so much to have been as to be 
now creating the universe", referred to his Monist articles, and said that 
"all reality is due to the creative power of God" [6.505]. 
Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism is an evolutionary form of  
pantheism that operates in the opposite direction from emanationism and 
Spinozism. Whereas the latter theologies proceed from the highest level 
(God) on down through successively lower levels, Peirce's cosmic evo- 
lutionism begins at the simplest level of  a random chaos of  feelings and 
gradually improves under the guidance of  final causality toward an infi- 
nite limit of  perfection. Thus Peirce's pantheism is emanationism "turned 
upside down". 
Both emanationism and Peirce's evolutionism hold that reality and 
perfection are intrinsically related. Successive emanations obey the meta- 
physical principle that a cause must have at least as much reality and value 
as its effect. In Peirce's evolutionism the distinction between good and evil 
only arises when the cosmos becomes organized, and as it becomes better 
organized the cosmos becomes better. Emanationism and Peirceanism do 
agree that evil is a lack of  good. 
We explained Peirce's logical principle "Do not block the road of  
inquiry" in the section on Tychism, and showed how it led to the doctrine 
that all laws are to some degree probabilistic. His evolutionary panthe- 
ism reflects the same principle, for it gives a gradual account of  creation 
rather than a one-shot account. Peirce was the first to develop a proba- 
bilistic account of the evolutionary origin of  tlae cosmos and of  biological 
evolution, and then make it the basis for a concept of  God. 
Since pantheism identifies God with the universe, it thereby includes in 
God the lower levels of  reality that theism treats as non-divine. But the pan- 
theist recognizes differences among levels or aspects, and identifies God 
with the highest level or aspect of  the universe. For Peirce this consisted of 
the triple cosmic logic of  Chance, Continuity, and Final Causality. Hegel 
identified God with the highest operation of dialectic, the iterated suc- 
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cession o f  Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. Thus both Peirce and Hegel  
held that R E A S O N  is the highest aspect o f  God. And they both regarded 
religious institutions as representing God in an imaginative, story-telling, 
and aesthetic way. [In contrast, the materialist George Santayana kept only 
these semiotic aspects o f  religion.] 
Peirce told more  about his concept  o f  God  when he compared his view 
with Hegel 's :  
. . .  my philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume. [1.42] 
This "strangeness" is the very  big difference between Peirce 's  cosmic 
evolutionary logic and Hegel ' s  dialectic logic o f  the Absolute. We showed 
earlier that Tychism, Synechism, and Agapism are cosmic generalizations 
o f  abduction, induction, and deduction, respectively. Peirce 's  "cos tume" 
is fuller than Hegel 's ,  because Hegel  had nothing analogous to abduction 
and induction. 
In Stage IV o f  his thought, Peirce modified and renamed his pragma- 
tism, calling it "pragmaticism" to accord with his extension o f  pragmatic 
rationality to cosmic rationality, what he called "the development  o f  con- 
crete reasonableness".  He then stated his relation to Hegel  in this way: 
The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from 
which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel 
degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as 
self-sufficient. (5.436) 
Here  is another quotation in which Peirce criticizes Hegel  for not having 
the equivalents o f  cosmic abduction and induction. 
[Hegel says that] the whole universe and every feature of it, however minute, is rational, 
and was constrained to be as it is by the logic of events, so that there is no principle of 
action in the universe but reason. But I reply, this line of thought, though it begins rightly, is 
not exact. A logical slip is committed; and the conclusion reached is manifestly at variance 
with observation. It is true that the whole universe and every feature of it must be regarded 
as rational, that is as brought about by the logic of events. But it does not follow that it is 
constrained to be as .it is by the logic of events; for the logic of evolution and of life need not 
be supposed to be of that wooden kind that absolutely constrains a given conclusion. [By 
the "wooden kind" Peirce is referring to the limited scope of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.] 
The logic may be that of the inductive or hypothetic [i.e., abductive] inference. 
This may-be is at once converted into must-be when we reflect that among the facts to 
be accounted for are such as that, for example, red things look red and not blue, and vice 
versa. It is obvious that that cannot be a necessary consequence of abstract being. 
The effect of this error of Hegel is that he is forced to deny [the] fundamental character of 
two elements of experience which cannot result from deductive logic [but require abduction 
and induction]. [6.218] 
Peirce 's  reference to deductive logic in the last sentence o f  this quotation 
needs explanation, for Hegel ' s  logic was not deductive, but dialectical. 
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The logic of  thesis-antithesis- synthesis is foundationally different from 
deduction• In a deductive logic a contradiction yields everything. Thus for 
any proposition q: 
p yields p V q 
p V q and ,-~ p yield q 
hence, p & ~ p yields q. 
The idea of  a contradiction is much more complicated in Hegelian logic. 
For in dialectic the contradiction between a thesis and its antithesis yields a 
synthesis, which combines the best elements of both thesis and antithesis. 
Nevertheless, before Hegel's time "logic" meant "deductive logic", and 
Hegel's dialectic logic is obviously more like deduction than like induction 
or abduction. 
CONCLUSION 
Peirce stated the guiding principle of his life-long philosophical quest when 
he was a young man: 
• . .  my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought. 
It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his 
will, his power over the animal organism . . . .  
This is man, 
" . . .  proud man, 
Most ignorant of what he's most assured, 
His glassy essence". 
[5.314-317, 1868] 
Man is a sign in an infinite semiotic and inferential process - that is his 
glassy essence. 
There are two distinct themes in historical idealism, one based on 
IDEALS and the other based on IDEAS, and they don't always go together. 
The first bases philosophy on human reason and attributes a lower status 
to human will and desire, believing that in the long run reason and ideals 
will prevail over evil. The second bases philosophy on human experiences, 
such as feelings or sense experiences. Peirce combined both traditions with 
his Agapism and his panpsychism. 
Humans generally hold that they and their organizations are the most 
advanced products of evolution. Hence it is natural for them to use their 
experiences as an analogical base for understanding the nature of  divinity. 
I think Peirce did this when analogizing from his own abductive and 
inductive inferences and his particular concept of  the infinitesimal to the 
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divine logics o f  Tychism and Synechism; he also did this when  analogizing 
f rom his own experiences o f  planned rational goal-  seeking to Agapism.  It 
would  therefore be natural  for h im to analogize f rom human  consciousness  
to some kind o f  consciousness  appropriate to God, and he did this ! in one 
o f  his Harvard  Lectures:  
Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast 
consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Diety relative to us . . . .  that 
[thesis] has the advantage of being supported by analogy. [5.107, 1903] 
On the other hand, a few years later he said the opposite: 
Since God, in His essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and 
since there is strong reason to hold what we call consciousness is either merely the general 
sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at aU events some visceral or bodily sensation, 
God probably has no consciousness. [6.489, 1908, boldface added] 
But  in " M a n ' s  Glassy  Essence"  he had general ized f rom human  conscious-  
ness to corporate  consciousness,  and corporat ions don ' t  have biological  
brains. 
The consciousness of a general idea has a certain "unity of the ego", in it, which is identical 
when it passes from one mind to another. It is, therefore, quite analogous to a person; 
and, indeed, a person is only a particular kind of general idea. Long ago, in the Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy (Vol. II, p. 156), I pointed out that a person is nothing but a symbol 
involving a general idea.. .  
All that is necessary, upon this theory, to the existence of a person is that the feelings out 
of which he is constructed should be in close enough connection to influence one another. 
Here we can draw a consequence which it may be possible to submit to experimental test. 
Namely, if this be the case, there should be something like personal consciousness in bodies 
of men who are in intimate and intensely sympathetic communion . . . .  Esprit de corps 
national sentiment, sym-pathy, are no mere metaphors. None of us can fully realize what 
the minds &corporations are, any more than one of my brain cells can know what the whole 
brain is thinking. But the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities 
. . .  [6.270-271, 1892] 
These  statements about  God  and consciousness  are inconsistent, so I 
will conclude b y  suggesting what  Peirce might  have consistently said on 
the subject. 
We humans  are the highest product  o f  evolution so far, and our conscious-  
planned-rat ional  goal-seeking is a unique ability. This ability is our chief  
inst rument  in the pursuit  o f  concrete reasonableness ,  both as individuals 
and in communi t ies  that pursue c o m m o n  ideals. 
God  is the creative power  in evolution. Consciousness  is a human  means  
for  contributing to the growth o f  concrete reasonableness.  As evolution 
continues,  it will develop more  and more  advanced means  for the growth o f  
concrete  reasonableness .  This strand in evolution is God ' s  consciousness.  
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Reality is a single complex, hierarchical, dynamic system. It is an infinite 
evolutionary developmental process that starts from nothing and progresses 
gradually toward greater complexity, rationality, and value. God is the 
creative, rational, teleological aspect of reality, the highest level of the 
system. 
NOTE 
* I wish to thank Don Roberts for his many helpful comments and Peirce 
references, Edwin Curley for his suggestions, and Michael Cohen for 
pointing out the need of a section explaining Peirce's panpsychic Firsts. I 
have profited from discussions with my wife, Alice, as well as from her 
editorial assistance. 
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